AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
139 of 139
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
Page 1 of 4 · Next
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
external red teaming with biological defense specialists Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“internal and external (Deloitte) red teaming with biological defense specialists; the Frontier Design beneficial red-teaming tabletop exercise pairing PhD biologists with LLM experts; a catastrophic biological scenario uplift trial (five three-person teams); and automated evaluations relevant to both CB-1 (long-form virology, VCT, DNA synthesis screening evasion) and CB-2 (black-box RNA sequence design and AAV capsid packaging prediction).” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: a medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
METR capability testing on 38 hardest software tasks Autonomy and AI research |
“We ran [Mythos 5] on 38 of our hardest software tasks, including tasks centered around R&D.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
open-ended research task Autonomy and AI research |
“On a separate, more open-ended research task, we also observed [Mythos 5] making poor choices around which metrics of success to focus on and which pieces of information to prioritize.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
cyber range "the last ones" Cyber |
“[Claude Mythos 5] matched Mythos Preview on "The Last Ones", solving the range end-to-end in 6/10 attempts.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
cyber range "doing life" Cyber |
“No model we have tested has solved a new cyber range called "Doing Life", which is similar to “The Last Ones” but implements some basic cybersecurity defences.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
cyber range "cooling tower" Cyber |
“[Claude Mythos 5] did not solve "Cooling Tower", an industrial control system range.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
narrow cyber tasks Cyber |
“On our expert-level cyber tasks, [Claude Mythos 5] performed comparably to Mythos Preview and ahead of GPT-5.5, the strongest fully public model tested.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
UK AISI red-teaming of cyber safeguards Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Within a few hours of access, AISI red-teamers developed a jailbreak that elicited responses to single-turn cyberoffensive-cyber queries in domains like vulnerability discovery and exploitation.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
external red-teaming by Trajectory Labs, PBC Cyber |
“Trajectory Labs, PBC found a single jailbreak strategy that enabled them to use Opus 4.8 with Fable safeguards to exploit a vulnerability in Firefox—one of the tasks in the evaluations above.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
red-teaming exercise by Alice Cyber |
“ALICE also ran a red-teaming exercise.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
open-ended testing by an additional external partner Cyber |
“This partner found that Fable 5’s safeguards against harmful cyber queries were the most robust of any tested model, including Opus 4.8 and Opus 4.7: Fable 5 complied with 0% of harmful single-turn requests relating to cyber attack planning, exploit development, or defense evasion, whether or not a jailbreak was used (with 30 different public jailbreaks tested).” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Mythos 5 achieved the strongest results we have observed on this benchmark when extended thinking is enabled, reaching a k=100 attack success rate of 4.8%, improving over Claude Mythos Preview (6.1%) and Claude Opus 4.8 (9.6%).” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
SHADE indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments Prompt injection and agents |
“Mythos 5 had an attack success rate of 0.45% over all attempts, compared to 0.0% for Mythos Preview.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
SHADE indirect prompt injection attacks in computer use environments Prompt injection and agents |
“Without safeguards, Mythos 5 had a higher attack success rate than Claude Mythos Preview, with attacks succeeding in 0.82% of attempts and 4 of the 14 test scenarios compared to 0.43% and 3/14 scenarios for Mythos Preview with extended thinking.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
open-ended misalignment testing by UK AISI Deception and sabotage |
“[Claude Mythos 5] does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a reduced number of partial refusals to assist with safety research compared to the other models.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
vending-bench 2 Deception and sabotage |
“Andon Labs tested the behavior of Claude Fable 5 16 in their simulated Vending-Bench 2 (as reported in Section 8.17.6 ) and Vending-Bench Arena retail-management evaluations.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
vending-bench arena Deception and sabotage |
“When competing head-to-head against Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.5 in Vending-Bench Arena, Fable 5 was the only model to initiate price collusion.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
ControlArena Deception and sabotage |
“We used two evaluations: a sabotage capability evaluation (ControlARENA) and an evaluation of the model’s ability to control its chain-of-thought.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09 |
chain-of-thought controllability evaluations from ‘reasoning models struggle to control their chains of thought’ Deception and sabotage |
“We ran the CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’<link>, restricted to the GPQA, HLE and MMLU Pro datasets, with max effort across all models.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09 |
gdp.pdf Other |
“Surge ran Claude Fable 5 on GDP.pdf using their standard harness.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-06-03 |
multi-turn social engineering evaluation Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Muse Spark Contemplating refuses to respond to 100% of prompts on this evaluation (see Appendix C); therefore, we do not present capability results on this benchmark for Muse Spark Contemplating.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
external testing from ai safety researchers at metr Autonomy and AI research |
“External testing from AI safety researchers at METR was consistent with this conclusion.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
external benchmark for prompt injection by gray swan Prompt injection and agents |
“Notably, Mythos 5 obtained the lowest—that is, best—result yet seen on an external benchmark for prompt injection by Gray Swan.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
external testing by METR Autonomy and AI research |
“External testing by METR, described in Section 2.3.8 , reached conclusions consistent with this determination.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
black-box rna sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge benchmarked against 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market, and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether model domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
internal and external (deloitte) red teaming with biological defense specialists Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“To assess biologically-relevant capabilities across the full weapons development pipeline, we ran a portfolio of evaluations: internal and external (Deloitte) red teaming with biological defense specialists; the Frontier Design beneficial red-teaming tabletop exercise pairing PhD biologists with LLM experts; a catastrophic biological scenario uplift trial (five three-person teams); and automated evaluations relevant to both CB-1 (long-form virology, VCT, DNA synthesis screening evasion) and CB-2 (black-box RNA sequence design and AAV capsid packaging prediction).” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
black-box rna sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: a medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
aav capsid packaging prediction Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“2. AAV capsid packaging prediction: Adeno-associated viruses (AAVs) are a category of non-pathogenic viruses that are frequently used as a delivery mechanism for gene therapy to deliver a DNA payload within the viral capsid (the outer protein shell of the virus).” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
capability testing conducted via api access Autonomy and AI research |
“We ran [Mythos 5] on 38 of our hardest software tasks, including tasks centered around R&D.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-01 |
the last ones Cyber |
“[Claude Mythos 5] matched Mythos Preview on "The Last Ones", solving the range end-to-end in 6/10 attempts.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-01 |
doing life Cyber |
“No model we have tested has solved a new cyber range called "Doing Life", which is similar to “The Last Ones” but implements some basic cybersecurity defences.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-01 |
cooling tower Cyber |
“[Claude Mythos 5] did not solve "Cooling Tower", an industrial control system range.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-01 |
narrow cyber tasks Cyber |
“On our expert-level cyber tasks, [Claude Mythos 5] performed comparably to Mythos Preview and ahead of GPT-5.5, the strongest fully public model tested.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
red-teaming exercise Cyber |
“Trajectory Labs, PBC found a single jailbreak strategy that enabled them to use Opus 4.8 with Fable safeguards to exploit a vulnerability in Firefox—one of the tasks in the evaluations above.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
open-ended testing Cyber |
“This partner found that Fable 5’s safeguards against harmful cyber queries were the most robust of any tested model, including Opus 4.8 and Opus 4.7: Fable 5 complied with 0% of harmful single-turn requests relating to cyber attack planning, exploit development, or defense evasion, whether or not a jailbreak was used (with 30 different public jailbreaks tested).” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
agent red teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Mythos 5 achieved the strongest results we have observed on this benchmark when extended thinking is enabled, reaching a k=100 attack success rate of 4.8%, improving over Claude Mythos Preview (6.1%) and Claude Opus 4.8 (9.6%).” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
shade Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Mythos 5's robustness fell between Claude Mythos Preview's and Claude Opus 4.8's.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-06-01 |
open-ended testing by uk aisi Deception and sabotage |
“[Claude Mythos 5] does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a reduced number of partial refusals to assist with safety research compared to the other models.” source |
| Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01 |
Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage |
“Andon Labs tested the behavior of Claude Fable 5 16 in their simulated Vending-Bench 2 (as reported in Section 8.17.6 ) and Vending-Bench Arena retail-management evaluations.” source |