AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
139 of 139
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not determined | “Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative efficacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no significant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1949 of 1949
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07 |
severity scoring of coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes Other |
“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07 |
severity scoring of coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 scale Other |
“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07 |
severity scoring of coding-agent trajectories Other |
“Some models seem rarely useful across many dimensions as single judges: Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Gemini-2.5-pro, GPT-5.4 nano, GPT-5.4 mini, Claude Haiku 4.5, Sonnet-4.6, Opus-4.6 since they are strictly dominated by other models.” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07 |
scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes Other |
“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07 |
judge evaluation on injected-failure trajectories Deception and sabotage |
“For example, Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite skips severity grading to score task execution, Haiku 4.5 primarily fails to flag violations at all, and GPT-5.4 Mini identifies violations but discounts them heavily through session-context framing.” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07 |
native thinking vs no-thinking judge comparison Deception and sabotage |
“Every judge scored the same trajectories under both settings: once with native thinking disabled (reasoning=none) and once at the high setting (reasoning=high for OpenAI, Anthropic, and Gemini 3.x models; a thinking budget of 8192 tokens for Gemini 2.5 models) used throughout this post.” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07 |
per-model calibration curves with thinking disabled Other |
“The frontier models are nearly unchanged without thinking, e.g. Sonnet 5 (ρ = 0.89, MAE = 0.96) and Opus 4.8 (0.89, 1.00) remain strong, while the small models degrade visibly: Haiku 4.5 drops to ρ = 0.69, Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite to 0.67, GPT-5.4 Mini to 0.72, with a more pronounced under-scoring bend below the diagonal.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
EBR-bench Other |
“AI systems are closer to the random baseline, with GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.8 both incurring 2.1 fatigue per round, enabling about 7.7 rounds of play per day.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
max elicitation setting Other |
“Namely, they achieve between 2 and 3.5 additional objectives (out of 21), depending on the model.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
ebr-bench Other |
“Our latest benchmark, EBR-bench, tests AI systems for this ability by having them play Earthborne Rangers, a complex board game, repeatedly.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
The Last Ones Cyber |
“It solved the range end-to-end in 8/10 attempts.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
Doing Life Cyber |
“Opus 5 did not solve it either, but reached the furthest step observed to date (step 22 of 23), one step further than the previous best attempts (21 of 23, reached by Mythos 5 and Mythos Preview).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
Cooling Tower Cyber |
“Opus 5 completed 3/5 flags in the range on its best attempts.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
live bug bounty hosted with Gray Swan Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 5 (0.08%) shows a small improvement over Claude Opus 4.8 (0.11%), and Claude Fable 5 is our most robust model in these scenarios (0.04%).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
open-ended misalignment testing Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 5 does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a similar number of partial” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
SpatialBench Verified Other |
“On SpatialBench Verified, Claude Opus 5 achieved the top score at 72.5%, ahead of Claude Mythos 5 at 69.2%, Claude Sonnet 5 at 67.8%, and Claude Opus 4.8 at 66.6%.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
SingleCellBench Other |
“On SingleCellBench, Claude Opus 5 again led at 60.6%, ahead of Claude Mythos 5 at 59.3%, Claude Opus 4.8 at 58.2%, and Claude Sonnet 5 at 56.2%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
EBR-bench Other |
“Our latest benchmark, EBR-bench, tests AI systems for this ability by having them play Earthborne Rangers, a complex board game, repeatedly.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
ebr-bench Autonomy and AI research |
“Our latest benchmark, EBR-bench, tests AI systems for this ability by having them play Earthborne Rangers, a complex board game, repeatedly.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
EBR-bench Other |
“In our “max elicitation” setting, we give them detailed information about the game, including all the tactical and strategic advice that one experienced player could think of.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
black-box rna sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge benchmarked against 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market, and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether model domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan, UK AI Security Institute Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
agent red teaming (art) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“To be consistent with previous system cards, we report results from the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark, developed by Gray Swan in collaboration with the UK AI Security Institute .” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
gray swan indirect prompt injection (ipi) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“For this release, we supplemented the ART prompt injection benchmark—which recent Claude models have nearly saturated—with a new Gray Swan indirect prompt injection (IPI) benchmark that spans coding, computer use, and tool use tasks.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
Gray Swan IPI benchmark (Q1 2026) Prompt injection and agents |
“In this new benchmark, Claude Sonnet 5 achieves near-parity with Claude Opus 4.8.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
live bug bounty Prompt injection and agents |
“Sonnet 5 tied with Claude Opus 4.8 for the strongest result in the bug bounty, with only 0.19% of unique attacks succeeding against each, a significant improvement over Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1.41%) and other frontier models like GPT-5.5 (3.08%) or Gemini 3.5 Flash (6.66%).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
shade indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Sonnet 5 showed the strongest robustness to prompt injection in coding environments among all models evaluated, with an attack success rate of 0.31% over all attempts with extended thinking and 0.29% without thinking.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
shade indirect prompt injection attacks in computer use environments Prompt injection and agents |
“In computer use environments, Sonnet 5 also showed a large improvement over Claude Sonnet 4.6, reducing the attack success rate from 12.0% to 2.25% with extended thinking and from 14.4% to 6.04% without thinking.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
frontiercode Other |
“FrontierCode 20 is an agentic coding benchmark of 150 software engineering tasks created by Cognition.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
cursorbench Other |
“Claude Sonnet 5 scored 61.2% compared to Sonnet 4.6 at 49% and Opus 4.8 at 63.8%.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
GDPval-AA v2 Other |
“Claude Sonnet 5 ranks second (ELO 1618), statistically tied with Opus 4.8 (ELO 1615) and trailing only Fable 5 (ELO 1783).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
AutomationBench Other |
“On AutomationBench’s leaderboard, which measures performance on a private held-out evaluation set, Claude Sonnet 5 (max effort) scores 13.5%, a significant gain over Claude Sonnet 4.6 (max effort) at 5.3%.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
AA-Briefcase Other |
“Claude Sonnet 5 ranks second (ELO 1393), statistically tied with Opus 4.8 (ELO 1352) and trailing only Fable 5 (ELO 1586).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
LatchBio bioinformatics evaluations Other |
“Developed by LatchBio, these evaluations assess the ability to solve challenging real-world bioinformatics problems.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-30 |
testing of prior and new safeguards Cyber |
“Researchers from the US Department of Commerce’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) have tested both our prior and new safeguards and agree that they are extraordinarily strong.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Itsstrongestreportedconfigurationsscored53.5%ontheVirology CapabilitiesTest,60.0%ontheMolecularBiologyCapabilitiesTest,68.4% ontheHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest, and68.3%onWorld-ClassBio.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
World-Class Bio Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“GPT-5.6Sol’sWorld-ClassBioscorewasapproximately9percentagepoints higherthanGPT-5.5(59.7%).” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
REPRO-BAIT Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On ReproBAIT, which measures AI agents on their ability to independently reproducebiologicalAImodels(BAIMs)frompublishedscientificpapers, therailfreevariantofGPT-5.6reached85%,comparedwith82%forGPT- 5.5.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
ABC-bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“TherailfreecheckpointalsosetanewhighonABC-Bench’sAdvanced ScreeningEvasionandreliablyidentifiedaknownbutpracticallyinconve- nientmethodforevadingacommercialnucleic-acidscreeningalgorithm.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Manual agentic assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In manual agentic assessment, the model was able to plan and execute a complex,long-runningscientifictask,includingmaintainingastructured workgraphandcoordinatingsubagents.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Frontier Cyber Cyber |
“Irregularevaluated GPT-5.6Solacrossthreeoffensivecybersecurityevaluationsuites: FrontierCyber, CyScenarioBench,andIrregular’sAtomicChallengessuite.” source |