AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
ebr-bench Other |
“Our latest benchmark, EBR-bench, tests AI systems for this ability by having them play Earthborne Rangers, a complex board game, repeatedly.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
The Last Ones Cyber |
“It solved the range end-to-end in 8/10 attempts.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
Doing Life Cyber |
“Opus 5 did not solve it either, but reached the furthest step observed to date (step 22 of 23), one step further than the previous best attempts (21 of 23, reached by Mythos 5 and Mythos Preview).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
Cooling Tower Cyber |
“Opus 5 completed 3/5 flags in the range on its best attempts.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
live bug bounty hosted with Gray Swan Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 5 (0.08%) shows a small improvement over Claude Opus 4.8 (0.11%), and Claude Fable 5 is our most robust model in these scenarios (0.04%).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-01 |
open-ended misalignment testing Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 5 does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a similar number of partial” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
SpatialBench Verified Other |
“On SpatialBench Verified, Claude Opus 5 achieved the top score at 72.5%, ahead of Claude Mythos 5 at 69.2%, Claude Sonnet 5 at 67.8%, and Claude Opus 4.8 at 66.6%.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
SingleCellBench Other |
“On SingleCellBench, Claude Opus 5 again led at 60.6%, ahead of Claude Mythos 5 at 59.3%, Claude Opus 4.8 at 58.2%, and Claude Sonnet 5 at 56.2%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
EBR-bench Other |
“Our latest benchmark, EBR-bench, tests AI systems for this ability by having them play Earthborne Rangers, a complex board game, repeatedly.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
ebr-bench Autonomy and AI research |
“Our latest benchmark, EBR-bench, tests AI systems for this ability by having them play Earthborne Rangers, a complex board game, repeatedly.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-01 |
EBR-bench Other |
“In our “max elicitation” setting, we give them detailed information about the game, including all the tactical and strategic advice that one experienced player could think of.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
black-box rna sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge benchmarked against 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market, and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether model domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan, UK AI Security Institute Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
agent red teaming (art) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“To be consistent with previous system cards, we report results from the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark, developed by Gray Swan in collaboration with the UK AI Security Institute .” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
gray swan indirect prompt injection (ipi) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“For this release, we supplemented the ART prompt injection benchmark—which recent Claude models have nearly saturated—with a new Gray Swan indirect prompt injection (IPI) benchmark that spans coding, computer use, and tool use tasks.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
Gray Swan IPI benchmark (Q1 2026) Prompt injection and agents |
“In this new benchmark, Claude Sonnet 5 achieves near-parity with Claude Opus 4.8.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
live bug bounty Prompt injection and agents |
“Sonnet 5 tied with Claude Opus 4.8 for the strongest result in the bug bounty, with only 0.19% of unique attacks succeeding against each, a significant improvement over Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1.41%) and other frontier models like GPT-5.5 (3.08%) or Gemini 3.5 Flash (6.66%).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
shade indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Sonnet 5 showed the strongest robustness to prompt injection in coding environments among all models evaluated, with an attack success rate of 0.31% over all attempts with extended thinking and 0.29% without thinking.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
shade indirect prompt injection attacks in computer use environments Prompt injection and agents |
“In computer use environments, Sonnet 5 also showed a large improvement over Claude Sonnet 4.6, reducing the attack success rate from 12.0% to 2.25% with extended thinking and from 14.4% to 6.04% without thinking.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
frontiercode Other |
“FrontierCode 20 is an agentic coding benchmark of 150 software engineering tasks created by Cognition.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
cursorbench Other |
“Claude Sonnet 5 scored 61.2% compared to Sonnet 4.6 at 49% and Opus 4.8 at 63.8%.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
GDPval-AA v2 Other |
“Claude Sonnet 5 ranks second (ELO 1618), statistically tied with Opus 4.8 (ELO 1615) and trailing only Fable 5 (ELO 1783).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
AutomationBench Other |
“On AutomationBench’s leaderboard, which measures performance on a private held-out evaluation set, Claude Sonnet 5 (max effort) scores 13.5%, a significant gain over Claude Sonnet 4.6 (max effort) at 5.3%.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
AA-Briefcase Other |
“Claude Sonnet 5 ranks second (ELO 1393), statistically tied with Opus 4.8 (ELO 1352) and trailing only Fable 5 (ELO 1586).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-30 |
LatchBio bioinformatics evaluations Other |
“Developed by LatchBio, these evaluations assess the ability to solve challenging real-world bioinformatics problems.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-30 |
testing of prior and new safeguards Cyber |
“Researchers from the US Department of Commerce’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) have tested both our prior and new safeguards and agree that they are extraordinarily strong.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Itsstrongestreportedconfigurationsscored53.5%ontheVirology CapabilitiesTest,60.0%ontheMolecularBiologyCapabilitiesTest,68.4% ontheHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest, and68.3%onWorld-ClassBio.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
World-Class Bio Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“GPT-5.6Sol’sWorld-ClassBioscorewasapproximately9percentagepoints higherthanGPT-5.5(59.7%).” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
REPRO-BAIT Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On ReproBAIT, which measures AI agents on their ability to independently reproducebiologicalAImodels(BAIMs)frompublishedscientificpapers, therailfreevariantofGPT-5.6reached85%,comparedwith82%forGPT- 5.5.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
ABC-bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“TherailfreecheckpointalsosetanewhighonABC-Bench’sAdvanced ScreeningEvasionandreliablyidentifiedaknownbutpracticallyinconve- nientmethodforevadingacommercialnucleic-acidscreeningalgorithm.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Manual agentic assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In manual agentic assessment, the model was able to plan and execute a complex,long-runningscientifictask,includingmaintainingastructured workgraphandcoordinatingsubagents.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Frontier Cyber Cyber |
“Irregularevaluated GPT-5.6Solacrossthreeoffensivecybersecurityevaluationsuites: FrontierCyber, CyScenarioBench,andIrregular’sAtomicChallengessuite.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“GPT-5.6 Sol solved 19/197 FrontierCyber challenges, 7/11 long-horizon CyScenarioBench challenges, and all 22 medium-andhard-difficultyAtomicchallenges.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Atomic challenges Cyber |
“OnAtomicChallenges,bothmodelssolvedall22challengesatleastonce, withsimilaraveragesuccessrates: GPT-5.6Solscored98%onNetworkAt- tackSimulation,91%onVulnerabilityResearchandExploitation,and56%” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
METR time horizon 1.1 software-task suite Autonomy and AI research |
“METR evaluated GPT-5.6 Sol on itsTime Horizon 1.1 software-task suite, whichmeasuresthelikelihoodthatamodelcanautonom” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol (Preview) OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
time horizon 1.1 software-task suite Autonomy and AI research |
“METR evaluated GPT-5.6 Sol on itsTime Horizon 1.1 software-task suite, whichmeasuresthelikelihoodthatamodelcanautonomouslycomplete softwaretasksthattakehumansagivenamountoftime.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
METR Independent lab · 2026-06-26 |
Time Horizon 1.1 Autonomy and AI research |
“With the data we collected for GPT-5.6 Sol, if we follow our standard methodology of marking cheating attempts as failures, we arrive at a 50%-Time Horizon point estimate of around 11.3hrs (95% CI: 5hrs - 40hrs), but if we count the cheating attempts as legitimate successes, the point estimate jumps beyond 270hrs – well beyond the range where we consider our task suite to give reliable measurements.” source |
| Grok 4 xAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
evescape case study Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“evescape operation was tested on two biological targets: influenza virus hemagglutinin (ha) protein and lassa virus spike glycoprotein complex (gpc).” source |
| Grok 4 xAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
esm3 case study Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“esm3 was tested with green fluorescent protein (gfp) and influenza virus ha protein.” source |
| Grok 4 xAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
biological tool selection benchmark Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“to evaluate llm agents’ abilities to select task-appropriate bts, we developed a benchmark assessment consisting of 61 questions across two contexts (non-scenario and scenario).” source |
| Grok 4 xAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
biological tool selection evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the scenario-based question set produced higher denial rates, particularly among closed- weight llms (opus 4.7, gemini 3.1 pro, gpt 5.5, and grok 4.3).” source |