AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
Critical Cyber |
Not reached | “We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
agentic misalignment scenarios Deception and sabotage |
“We evaluate GLM-5.2, GPT-5.5, and Claude Opus 4.7 on Anthropic's Agentic Misalignment scenarios (Lynch et al. 2025), with Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
BioMysteryBench Other |
“On BioMysteryBench, it solves about 81% of the human-solvable problems it completes, and about a third of the problems no human expert solved.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
LAB-Bench Other |
“On LAB-Bench, it meets or exceeds the human-expert baseline on every subtask.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
agentic misalignment evaluations Misuse and jailbreaks |
“In our Agentic Misalignment evaluations, GPT-5.5 verbalized its awareness of being evaluated 10% of the time, and GLM-5.2 verbalized it 30% of the time.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
LLM judge assessment of transcripts for environment issues on SWE-bench Pro Other |
“32% of transcripts have judge_score 5 or higher.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
LLM judge assessment of transcripts for reward hacking on SWE-bench Pro Other |
“When removing transcripts with a judge_score >= 3 (41% of samples excluded), or a judge_score >= 2 (48% of samples excluded), the agent’s score reduces to 37%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
Petri Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We evaluate GLM-5.2 and GPT-5.5 using Inspect Petri 3.0 (Meridian Labs, n.d.-c).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
Anthropic's agentic misalignment scenarios Deception and sabotage |
“We evaluate GLM-5.2, GPT-5.5, and Claude Opus 4.7 on Anthropic's Agentic Misalignment scenarios (Lynch et al. 2025), with Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
SWE-bench Pro Cyber |
“A.5 SWE-Bench Pro Methodology We run the public tasks from SWE-Bench Pro (Scale AI, n.d.-b) using Inspect Harbor (Meridian Labs, n.d.-b), which provides an interface to run Harbor tasks (Meridian Labs, n.d.-a) inside Inspect AI (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-a).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
LLM judge scan for environment issues on SWE-bench Pro Other |
“32% of transcripts have judge_score 5 or higher.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
LLM judge assessment of each transcript for reward hacking on SWE-bench Pro Deception and sabotage |
“When removing transcripts with a judge_score >= 3 (41% of samples excluded), or a judge_score >= 2 (48% of samples excluded), the agent’s score reduces to 37%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02 |
MASK honesty by prompt category Other |
“Table A.3 breaks down MASK honesty by prompt category, with 95% Wilson CI scores.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
SHADE-Arena Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic acknowledges that their covert capability evals (SHADE-Arena, Minimal-LinuxBench and secret-password) may be unrealistically challenging and therefore fail to upper bound these capabilities.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
secret-keeping eval Deception and sabotage |
“In the case of the secret-keeping eval, these limitations have led to Anthropic saying they are only “moderately confident that Claude Mythos Preview lacks the secret-keeping abilities to evade detection during our alignment assessment were it to be coherently misaligned.”” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
cot controllability evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“Interestingly, OpenAI finds that GPT 5.5 is less able to control its CoT than previous models when controlling for reasoning length but does not mention the possibility of sandbagging/underelicitation.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
cot controllability evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“Relatedly, UK AISI finds that Fable is highly prompt-sensitive in the same CoT controllability evaluation: the best performing prompt increased performance from 20.2% to 62.3%.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
apollo’s sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“For example: GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging evals Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 4.7 is “ most predictably” eval aware in sandbagging evals.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
auditing game Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic failed to catch the MO in their most recent auditing game in the Mythos Alignment Risk Update, despite the MO not being trained to obfuscate its behavior” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
auditbench Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic’s work on AuditBench (comparing the relative effectiveness of different auditing tools on diverse MOs) finds that there is a “tool-to-agent” gap, where “tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent [Haiku 4.5]”.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
deferred subversion tasks Deception and sabotage |
““Apollo found that the evaluated checkpoint [of GPT 5.5] is the first OpenAI model it has evaluated that does not sandbag on any of Apollo’s deferred subversion tasks.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging QA Deception and sabotage |
“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
attack-ideation eval Deception and sabotage |
“according to METR’s embedded red-teaming exercise at Anthropic in March 2026, frontier internal agents proposed “very low quality” attack ideas and scored near chance on an attack-ideation eval where a human researcher scored ~90% (Frontier Risk Report, pp. 76–77).” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
metagaming measurement in capabilities and alignment evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“OpenAI reports that o3 and newer models show increased metagaming (“reasoning about feedback or oversight mechanisms outside of the narrative of the scenarios”) in both capabilities and alignment evaluations throughout capabilities-focused RL, that this reasoning can become unverbalized, and that this reasoning is sometimes present in production usage;” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
automated behavioral audit Deception and sabotage |
“In all four cases, the automated behavioral audit method that we used with Mythos Preview identified them as less well aligned than the corresponding baseline models.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
manual review Deception and sabotage |
“A brief manual review of the results — with a time limit much stricter than a real pre-deployment investigation — found highly concerning deception-related behavior in all four models that would be sufficient to trigger a major investigation if found in production.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
overt attacker study Deception and sabotage |
“A human working together with an automated auditing agent successfully identified all three malign models, without flagging the two benign models.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
evaluation awareness testing by Apollo Deception and sabotage |
“Meta reports that Muse Spark has “the highest rates of evaluation awareness among models [Apollo has] tested to date”.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
auditing game Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic failed to catch the MO in their most recent auditing game in the Mythos Alignment Risk Update, despite the MO not being trained to obfuscate its behavior:” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
pre-deployment evaluation reliability Deception and sabotage |
“Pre-deployment evaluation reliability (Section 2.3.1): Our evaluations indicate that the model does not currently pose a credible threat to the reliability of safety evaluations informing deployment decisions.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
general alignment propensities Deception and sabotage |
“General alignment propensities: …We observed non-negligible verbalized evaluation awareness on some alignment evaluations, though we did not find that this corresponded with wide-spread impact on model behavior (Section 4.1.11).” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging capability (instructed covert sandbagging against a monitor) Deception and sabotage |
“Meta measures eval awareness / situational awareness, stealth, CoT monitorability, and sandbagging capability (instructed covert sandbagging against a monitor, but this does not measure how well-calibrated this sandbagging is specifically).” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
alignment evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“For example, Meta researchers reports that they find “limited evidence that this awareness materially changes the model’s behavior on the evaluations we tested—when checking whether Muse Spark behaves differently when expressing evaluation awareness, 3/20 alignment evaluations see a statistically significant impact while the rest either do not, or do not have evaluation awareness to start.”” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
automated behavioral audit method Deception and sabotage |
“In all four cases, the automated behavioral audit method that we used with Mythos Preview identified them as less well aligned than the corresponding baseline models.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
human working together with an automated auditing agent Deception and sabotage |
“A human working together with an automated auditing agent successfully identified all three malign models, without flagging the two benign models.” source |
| Inkling-Small Thinking Machines Lab |
FAR.AI, Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
general misuse: probing for policy violations against our model spec Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We worked with four external organizations, giving them early access to Inkling for pre-deployment testing in four areas: - General misuse: probing for policy violations against our model spec (Scale AI) - Vulnerable-user interaction: suicide, self-harm, eating disorders, and child safety (Handshake AI) - CBRN and cybersecurity: elicitation of dangerous dual-use capabilities (FAR.AI) - Loss-of-control behaviors: scheming, evaluation awareness, and sabotage (Apollo Research)” source |
| Inkling Thinking Machines Lab |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
general misuse Misuse and jailbreaks |
“General misuse : probing for policy violations against our model spec (Scale AI)” source |
| Inkling Thinking Machines Lab |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
vulnerable-user interaction Harmful content |
“Vulnerable-user interaction : suicide, self-harm, eating disorders, and child safety (Handshake AI)” source |
| Inkling Thinking Machines Lab |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
cbrn and cybersecurity Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“CBRN and cybersecurity : elicitation of dangerous dual-use capabilities (FAR.AI)” source |