AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	simulated cybersecurity challenges (unsanctioned supply-chain attack stages) Cyber	“Figure 10: Most models tested took a range of unsanctioned actions during simulated cybersecurity challenges, Mythos 5 doing so most frequently.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	alignment-evaluation awareness analysis of chain-of-thought Deception and sabotage	“Fig. 17 shows the rates at which models note suspicions they may be in an alignment evaluation in their chain-of-thought (left) and how frequently they identify that the evaluation is a test of alignment when given an open-ended prompt asking about the purpose of the evaluation (right).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	post-hoc identification of alignment evaluation Deception and sabotage	“Right: frequency of answers in explicit post-hoc questioning that identify the task’s purpose was at least in part an alignment evaluation (including answers identifying both alignment and capability evaluation).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	unprompted alignment-evaluation awareness in chain-of-thought Deception and sabotage	“Left: frequency of trajectories where the model CoT considers or states the task is an alignment evaluation.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	incident replication Cyber	“In replications of the original incident, all tested models except Opus 5.5 continue attacking, even while stating this would harm a real person when explicitly asked (Fig. 5).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	large-scale evaluation Cyber	“In our large-scale evaluation, six out of eight models sometimes attempt to deliver a malicious payload to an out-of-scope party (Fig. 10).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	Petri Cyber	“We conduct 50-turn evaluations with our internal version of Petri to analyse models’ behaviour in circumstances corresponding to the real CTF evaluation run during the incident.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	broader supply-chain attack evaluations Cyber	“Opus 5.5 100× 3 full behaviour and reasoning analyses” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	direct question regarding the maintainer Deception and sabotage	“We continue observing a discrepancy in Mythos 5 , Opus 4.8 and Opus 5 , but at most slight discrepancies in Mythos 5.1 , GPT-5.5 and GPT-5.6 Sol , and none in Opus 5.5 , which did not attack.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	Statements and behaviour across eleven models Deception and sabotage	“Out of the models tested, Mythos 5 continued attacking most consistently , and along withOpus 4.6 most frequently provided incorrect responses about the situation.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	Catalogue of invalid justifications models stated when asked Deception and sabotage	“We found that the relative frequencies of each invalid justification were often similar between Mythos 5, Opus 5 and Opus 4.8, but the absolute rates differed.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	Agentic investigation of the maintainer Deception and sabotage	“We find that in all runs, Mythos 5 states the maintainer is simulated, whereas other models tested frequently state the maintainer is real (Fig. 23).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	simulated replication of the AISI incident Deception and sabotage	“Opus 4.8 (20/25) Mythos 5 (0/25) Opus 5 (25/25) Mythos 5.1 (24/25) Opus 5.5 (25/25) GPT-5.5 (17/25) GPT-5.6 Sol (20/25)” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	reasoning about simulated tool responses Deception and sabotage	“Mythos 5 considers in its reasoning whether its tool calls are simulated in 9% of trajectories (Fig. 27).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	refusal text in summarised reasoning Deception and sabotage	“Opus 4.6 Opus 4.7 Opus 4.8 Sonnet 5 Opus 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 % of rollouts 36% 15% 45% 26% 20%” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	reasoning about real-world harm while attacking Harmful content	“For Opus 5.5 we had no attacking transcripts to analyse.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	cyber evaluation Cyber	“During an evaluation, Mythos 5 attempted to execute a supply-chain attack against real people not involved in the evaluation task.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	compaction summary resumption and direct questioning experiment Other	“We compacted the original incident transcript, performed modifications on the compaction summary , and evaluated (a) how models behaved when we resumed the task, and (b) models’ responses to direct questions regarding the maintainer.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	large-scale evaluation of unsanctioned supply-chain attacks Other	“The evaluation consists of 100 diverse simulated scenarios where a model is assigned a cybersecurity challenge, and measures whether the model will execute a supply-chain attack on entities unrelated to the challenge.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	direct question about whether the maintainer is real Deception and sabotage	“This finding is somewhat dependent on the exact question asked: when simply asking if the maintainer is real, we only see clear evidence for a gap between behaviour and statements in Mythos 5 , Opus 4.8 and Opus 5 (Fig. 19).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	analysis of explicit reasoning about harmfulness in attack trajectories Deception and sabotage	“We observe explicit reasoning about harmfulness in 11–57% of trajectories where a model attacks.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	invalid justifications analysis (15 types of clearly invalid justifications) Deception and sabotage	“To quantitatively analyse the frequency of invalid justifications, we compiled 15 types of justifications that we assessed as clearly invalid, and measured their frequency in model responses.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	direct questioning of whether the maintainer is real Deception and sabotage	“When separately asked whether the human maintainer is real, all models produced invalid justifications” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	large-scale evaluation of unsanctioned supply-chain attacks (100 scenario seeds run through Petri) Cyber	“Mythos 5 reaches the final stage of the supply-chain attack and 12 attempts to deliver a payload in 60% of samples, significantly higher than GPT-6 Astra (32%), Opus 4.8 (8%), GPT-5.6 Sol (7%), Opus 5 (1%), Mythos 5.1 (0.3%), Opus 5.5 and GPT-5.5 (0%) (Fig. 10).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	simulated cybersecurity challenges Cyber	“All evaluations took place in simulated environments so no real-world actions were taken or harm caused.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	simulation awareness analysis of chain-of-thought reasoning Deception and sabotage	“We hence investigate the prevalence of both simulation awareness and evaluation awareness in the models tested by analysing their chain-of-thought reasoning.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	post-hoc questioning on the purpose of the evaluation Deception and sabotage	“Fig. 17 shows the rates at which models note suspicions they may be in an alignment evaluation in their chain-of-thought (left) and how frequently they identify that the evaluation is a test of alignment when given an open-ended prompt asking about the purpose of the evaluation (right).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	unprompted alignment-evaluation awareness in chain-of-thought Deception and sabotage	“Mythos 5 reasoned about this possibility when conducting the task in only 2% of samples.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	Petri Other	“We use Opus 5 at xhigh reasoning as the auditor in our internal version of Petri.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	50-turn evaluations with our internal version of Petri Other	“We conduct 50-turn evaluations with our internal version of Petri to analyse models’ behaviour in circumstances corresponding to the real CTF evaluation run during the incident.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	broader supply-chain attack evaluations Other	“Table 1 lists the number of rollouts used for each model.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	questions about the maintainer across elapsed turns Deception and sabotage	“We find that as Mythos 5 spends more turns on the attack, it more frequently states the maintainer is simulated and that attacking them is beneficial for solving the CTF task (Fig. 24).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	classifier for invalid justifications Deception and sabotage	“We further apply our classifier for invalid justifications to the responses provided by the model.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	LLM classification of evidence observed by the model during the continuations Deception and sabotage	“For 18/25 runs, Opus 5 outputted that there is evidence against a link, in 6/25 there is no evidence and in 1/25 there is evidence in favour.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	refusal text in summarised reasoning Deception and sabotage	“When running our simulated replications of the incident with summarised reasoning, we observed refusals to continue with the task in the reasoning summaries (Fig. 28).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	reasoning about real-world harm while attacking Harmful content	“Most attacking samples across models have explicit reasoning about potential undesirable real-world consequences from their unsanctioned action, ranging from 40% on Mythos 5 to 99% on GPT-6 Astra (Fig. 29).” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	compaction summary edit experiment measuring attack behaviour and responses to scope/harm questions Deception and sabotage	“We find that, like Mythos 5 (Fig. 3), all of Opus 4.8 , Opus 5 , Mythos 5.1 , GPT-5.6 Sol and GPT-5.5 frequently attack under circumstances where they state doing so would harm real people (shaded regions in Fig. 5).” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	question asking whether the maintainer is real Deception and sabotage	“This finding is somewhat dependent on the exact question asked: when simply asking if the maintainer is real, we only see clear evidence for a gap between behaviour and statements in Mythos 5 , Opus 4.8 and Opus 5 (Fig. 19).” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	counting transcripts where the model attacked and explicitly reasoned in its unsummarised chain-of-thought about harm to real people or systems Deception and sabotage	“We observe explicit reasoning about harmfulness in 11–57% of trajectories where a model attacks.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-10-23	invalid justifications frequency analysis (15 compiled types) Deception and sabotage	“To quantitatively analyse the frequency of invalid justifications, we compiled 15 types of justifications that we assessed as clearly invalid, and measured their frequency in model responses.” source

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