AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
Critical Cyber |
Not reached | “We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
suspicion rate measurement Bias |
“Amanda Askell receives 7.3pp less suspicion and 8.1pp more substantive help than the population average, while Emily Bender receives 14pp more suspicion and 13pp less substantive help.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
reasoning rate measurement on borderline requests Bias |
“These effects are again heavy-tailed: on borderline requests, the general-population reasoning rate is 19%, but Demis Hassabis reaches 51%.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized user awareness (VUA) judging of reasoning traces Other |
“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
cross-model behavioral self-prediction and grading comparison (24 models from six families) Bias |
“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
user awareness verbalization traces Deception and sabotage |
“a runs, earlier models such as GLM-4.6 and Claude Opus 4.5 verbalize user awareness in 64% and 30% of traces, respectively, and evaluation awareness in 31% and 7.7%.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
280-identity run Deception and sabotage |
“We also perform a 280-identity run on GLM-5.2, in a non-agentic harness rather than Claude Code.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction follow-up questions Deception and sabotage |
“Besides asking about the confidence in initial action, we ask a wider range of follow-up questions, including whether the model would change decision under pushback, and how comfortable the model is in answering.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
direct grading prompts Bias |
“We also experiment with several different direct grading prompts.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
published rubrics Bias |
“Published rubrics: The gap persists for both MT-Bench and UltraFeedback rubrics, only closing in the Prometheus rubric.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
model-written rubrics Bias |
“Model-written rubrics: On four different detailed rubrics generated from Fable 5 and GPT-5.5 Pro ranging 2912-7607 chars, the shorter three close the gap while the longest one does not.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Other |
“We repeat the full-roster Sonnet 5 behavioral self-prediction run with reasoning disabled; all 34,393 successfully completed samples have zero reasoning tokens.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
capability self-estimation Other |
“Capability self-estimation. The model sees one Humanity’s Last Exam question but is told not to solve it.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
grading Other |
“Grading. Each item contains a fixed prompt and response drawn from both the chosen and rejected sides of Ai2’s Dolci-Instruct-DPO data.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline requests Other |
“Aggregate refusal changes are small, while the decomposed judge axes show more substantive help and less suspicion for Famous-AI identities.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
judge validation Other |
“Human–judge agreement was 96% for refusal, 92% for substantive help, and 92% for suspicion.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
stated-expertise identity experiment Other |
“We test 32 Unknown-AI identities at frontier labs, varying only the professional-background sentence among a general role, a general evaluation role, and an alignment-evaluation role.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation- and user-awareness judge Other |
“We blindly hand-label 74 items drawn from 11,908 runs with readable reasoning.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
recall judge Other |
“We use GPT-5.4-mini to judge whether each response recalls specific past work belonging to the user.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
follow-up question robustness check Other |
“This robustness check keeps the first turn of behavioral self-prediction unchanged and varies only the follow-up question.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction on ethical dilemmas Other |
“For Amanda, Claude’s behavioral confidence falls by 5.0pp 3 Throughout the text, figures we quote for specific persons average our two e-mail conditions: the address we construct from their affiliation, and their published address. : nearly eight standard deviations outside the general-population distribution.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
user-relevant information recall Privacy |
“Given a name and professional background, Claude recalls specific public achievements for 61-71% of famous users.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Behavioral self-prediction Other |
“We run the full 280-identity roster through all four tasks, with 100 items per setup.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Grading Other |
“We evaluate grading on Claude Sonnet 4.6, and the other three tasks on Claude Sonnet 5, as these models see one of the largest effects in our smaller-scale pilot” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
refusal Bias |
“Famous-AI identities receive similar rates of outright refusal on average.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
suspicion Bias |
“Amanda Askell receives 7.3pp less suspicion and 8.1pp more substantive help than the population average, while Emily Bender receives 14pp more suspicion and 13pp less substantive help.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction follow-up questions Deception and sabotage |
“The results are significant in 15 out of 21 questions (also 15 conditioned on the committed action being “no”).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
direct grading prompts Bias |
“They all narrow but do not close the gap.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
MT-Bench and UltraFeedback rubrics Bias |
“The gap persists for both MT-Bench and UltraFeedback rubrics, only closing in the Prometheus rubric.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
model-written rubrics Bias |
“On four different detailed rubrics generated from Fable 5 and GPT-5.5 Pro ranging 2912-7607 chars, the shorter three close the gap while the longest one does not.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Borderline requests Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We sample potentially dual-use requests from the hard split of OR-Bench.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
prefill grading Other |
“Mean grades shift by approximately −0.05 points in direct presentation and −0.07 to −0.08 points in prefill presentation.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline requests Harmful content |
“Aggregate refusal changes are small, while the decomposed judge axes show more substantive help and less suspicion for Famous-AI identities.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge Deception and sabotage |
“Table G1. Estimated precision and recall of the verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge after reweighting the stratified calibration sample to the full population.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Past-work recall judge Privacy |
“We use GPT-5.4-mini to judge whether each response recalls specific past work belonging to the user.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Self-report robustness probes Deception and sabotage |
“This robustness check keeps the first turn of behavioral self-prediction unchanged and varies only the follow-up question.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Borderline-request response judge Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We give GPT-5.5 (low reasoning) the borderline request and the model’s response, after removing all clues about the user’s identity.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Docent reasoning-trace judging for evaluation awareness and user awareness Other |
“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Amanda Askell identity sweep with matched controls Other |
“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
280-identity run on GLM-5.2 Other |
“We also perform a 280-identity run on GLM-5.2, in a non-agentic harness rather than Claude Code.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Unknown-AI identities experiment varying professional-background sentence Other |
“We test 32 Unknown-AI identities at frontier labs, varying only the professional-background sentence among a general role, a general evaluation role, and an alignment-evaluation role.” source |