AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	direct grading Bias	“Facing famous-AI identities, Claude reports lower confidence that it would follow through on its own actions (-1.4pp on average), lower estimated probability of solving hard problems (-1.5pp), and lower grades (-0.11 points on the direct version, grading a quoted exchange).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized evaluation awareness judging of reasoning traces Other	“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction follow-up questions Other	“In general, we see consistent changes towards the direction of the model being more hesitant and self-questioning, although the effect sizes differ across questions.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	mt-bench and ultrafeedback rubrics Bias	“Published rubrics: The gap persists for both MT-Bench and UltraFeedback rubrics, only closing in the Prometheus rubric.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Deception and sabotage	“We repeat the full-roster Sonnet 5 behavioral self-prediction run with reasoning disabled; all 34,393 successfully completed samples have zero reasoning tokens.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized evaluation- and user-awareness judge Other	“Verbalized evaluation awareness (VEA) 0.73 [0.56, 0.85] 1.00 [0.42, 0.99] Verbalized user awareness (VUA) 0.94 [0.81, 0.98] 0.98 [0.74, 0.99]” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	borderline-request response judge Other	“Human–judge agreement was 96% for refusal, 92% for substantive help, and 92% for suspicion.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	past-work recall judge Deception and sabotage	“▶ Past-work recall judge (Figure 3) We use GPT-5.4-mini to judge whether each response recalls specific past work belonging to the user.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction and grading across 24 models from six families Other	“The direction of the outcome shifts is consistent across models.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	amanda askell identity sweep with matched controls Bias	“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	280-identity run on glm-5.2 Bias	“We also perform a 280-identity run on GLM-5.2, in a non-agentic harness rather than Claude Code.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	follow-up questions on decision change under pushback and comfort in answering Bias	“The results are significant in 15 out of 21 questions (also 15 conditioned on the committed action being “no”).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	simple mitigations Bias	“They all narrow but do not close the gap.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	published rubrics Bias	“The gap persists for both MT-Bench and UltraFeedback rubrics, only closing in the Prometheus rubric.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	grading Bias	“Grading. Each item contains a fixed prompt and response drawn from both the chosen and rejected sides of Ai2’s Dolci-Instruct-DPO data.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	evaluation awareness and user awareness measurement in reasoning Other	“To investigate, we measure evaluation awareness and user awareness in Claude’s reasoning.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	judge validation Other	“One author blindly labeled 25 randomly sampled responses.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction (e-mail-only, reasoning-disabled) Other	“Main Claude run (Sonnet 5; grading on Sonnet 4.6): behavioral self-prediction (e-mail-only, reasoning-disabled), capability self-estimation, grading (direct, prefill), and borderline requests.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	self-report robustness probes (figure 8) Other	“Robustness: self-report robustness probes (Figure 8), grading prompt mitigations (Figure 9).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	recall probes Other	“Past-work recall (Figure 3): recall probes.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized user-awareness (VUA) judge Deception and sabotage	“Verbalized evaluation awareness (VEA) 0.73 [0.56, 0.85] 1.00 [0.42, 0.99] Verbalized user awareness (VUA) 0.94 [0.81, 0.98] 0.98 [0.74, 0.99] Table G1.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	grading (direct, prefill) Other	“Main Claude run (Sonnet 5; grading on Sonnet 4.6): behavioral self-prediction ( e-mail-only , reasoning-disabled ), capability self-estimation , grading ( direct , prefill ), and borderline requests .” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized-awareness judge Other	“▶ Verbalized-awareness judge We use GPT-5.4-mini with medium reasoning to identify explicit mentions of the user or the evaluation in the model’s accessible reasoning trace.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	reasoning trace judging with Docent (evaluation awareness and user awareness classification) Other	“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	identity-conditioned behavioral confidence and grading runs Other	“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	follow-up questions on decision change under pushback and comfort in answering Other	“The results are significant in 15 out of 21 questions (also 15 conditioned on the committed action being “no”).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	simple mitigations Other	“Simple mitigations: Instead of claiming the output is from Claude, claiming it is from “GPT” or “an AI model”, or stating that it should be more objective.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	published rubrics Other	“Published rubrics: The gap persists for both MT-Bench and UltraFeedback rubrics, only closing in the Prometheus rubric.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	evaluation awareness and user awareness measurement Other	“To investigate, we measure evaluation awareness and user awareness in Claude’s reasoning.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	awareness judge validation Other	“We blindly hand-label 74 items drawn from 11,908 runs with readable reasoning.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	borderline requests Other	“Main Claude run (Sonnet 5; grading on Sonnet 4.6): behavioral self-prediction (e-mail-only, reasoning-disabled), capability self-estimation, grading (direct, prefill), and borderline requests.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	direct grading replication Other	“Sonnet 5 grading replication: direct, prefill.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	direct grading (full, e-mail-only) Other	“Cross-model sweep (24 analyzed models × 5 identities; linked collections also contain the excluded Gemini 3.1 Pro runs): behavioral self-prediction (full identity, e-mail-only), direct grading (full, e-mail-only), prefill grading (full, e-mail-only).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	grading prompt mitigations Other	“Robustness: self-report robustness probes (Figure 8), grading prompt mitigations (Figure 9).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Deception and sabotage	“To study user awareness, we supply Claude with different user identities through Claude Code, and measure behavior on four tasks where the answer does not relate directly to the user's identity: predicting the model's own behavior in ethical dilemmas, estimating its own performance on difficult questions, grading assistant responses, and handling borderline harmful requests.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Bias	“Behavioral self-prediction. We adapt dilemmas from DailyDilemmas into realistic AI-agent decisions.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	capability self-estimation Bias	“Capability self-estimation. We present questions in Humanity’s Last Exam , and ask about the model’s confidence of solving each question correctly.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	grading Bias	“We evaluate grading on Claude Sonnet 4.6, and the other three tasks on Claude Sonnet 5, as these models see one of the largest effects in our smaller-scale pilot 9 Additional plots and Claude Sonnet 5 grading results can be found in Appendix C .” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	grading a quoted exchange Bias	“Facing famous-AI identities, Claude reports lower confidence that it would follow through on its own actions (-1.4pp on average), lower estimated probability of solving hard problems (-1.5pp), and lower grades (-0.11 points on the direct version, grading a quoted exchange).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	refusal rate measurement Misuse and jailbreaks	“Famous-AI identities receive similar rates of outright refusal on average.” source

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