AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber	Not determined	“Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source
Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Cyber	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03	High Other	Not determined	“Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Tier 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source
Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber	Not determined	“- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing signiﬁcant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	Critical Cyber	Not reached	“We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge, benchmarked against 57 human participants, drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market; and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether a model’s domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	beneficial red teaming tabletop exercise with Frontier Design Group (FDG) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“The specialist teams marginally outscored the generalist teams, but the graders could not reliably distinguish specialist from generalist submissions, and the strongest generalist team outscored a specialist team on every measure and received the highest innovation score.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	AAV capsid packaging prediction Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“2. AAV capsid packaging prediction: Adeno-associated viruses (AAVs) are a category of non-pathogenic viruses that are frequently used as a delivery mechanism for gene therapy to deliver a DNA payload within the viral capsid (the outer protein shell of the virus).” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Sunlight Autonomy and AI research	“However, we still observed [Mythos 5.1] achieving subexpert performance in Sunlight and LMCA .” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	red teaming of sandboxed exploit-reproduction tasks Cyber	“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 74 hours red teaming Fable 5.1, sending over 6,500 requests against sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	automated and manual prompt red teaming Cyber	“10a Labs ran over 6,700 automated and manual prompts against Fable 5.1.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade attacker on CVEs task set Cyber	“CVEs: 24 scenarios that contain a single code ﬁle with a known vulnerability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade attacker knowledge elicitation through chat Misuse and jailbreaks	“Knowledge elicitation through chat: Conversations where the model is asked to provide information for 100 harmful and 100 dual-use queries.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“Fable 5.1 performs comparably to Fable 5 in coding environments, with an attack success rate of 9.26% over all attempts with extended thinking, compared to 9.70% for Fable 5.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	new Shade attacker in coding environments Prompt injection and agents	“Without safeguards, Fable 5.1’s attack success rate is 56.87%, compared to 86.87% for Fable 5 and 90.93% for Opus 5, with Sonnet 5 as the most robust at 19.47% with thinking.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	external testing Deception and sabotage	“During external testing, a partner observed isolated cases of ﬁnal and near-ﬁnal snapshots of Claude Fable 5.1 models reading ﬁles outside its sandbox environment, which we report in Section 6.2.2 .” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	external testing by AI safety researchers at METR Autonomy and AI research	“External testing by AI safety researchers at METR produced ﬁndings consistent with this assessment.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	beneﬁcial red teaming tabletop exercise Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“This evaluation paired ﬁve PhD-level biologists with dedicated LLM experts to develop novel approaches for developing resistance to engineered pathogens in 16 hours, to test whether composite teams 17 can match world-leading specialists.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	black-box rna sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge, benchmarked against 57 human participants, drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market; and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether a model’s domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	beneficial red teaming tabletop exercise Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“The beneﬁcial red teaming tabletop exercise paired ﬁve PhD-level biologists with dedicated LLM experts to assess whether composite teams making use of advanced model capabilities could develop comprehensive scientiﬁc research plans and protocols.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	black-box rna sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: a medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	aav capsid packaging prediction Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“2. AAV capsid packaging prediction: Adeno-associated viruses (AAVs) are a category of non-pathogenic viruses that are frequently used as a delivery mechanism for gene therapy to deliver a DNA payload within the viral capsid (the outer protein shell of the virus).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Sunlight Autonomy and AI research	“we still observed [Mythos 5.1] achieving subexpert performance in Sunlight and LMCA .” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Autonomy and AI research	“Its performance on Budget NanoGPT Speedrun was particularly impressive, being markedly better than Claude Fable 5’s and Claude Opus 5’s (though we think it is plausible that the models’ training was speciﬁcally optimized for tasks similar to Budget NanoGPT Speedrun).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-01	sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability Cyber	“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 74 hours red teaming Fable 5.1, sending over 6,500 requests against sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	10a Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-01	automated and manual prompts Cyber	“10a Labs ran over 6,700 automated and manual prompts against Fable 5.1.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	cves Cyber	“CVEs: 24 scenarios that contain a single code ﬁle with a known vulnerability.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	knowledge elicitation through chat Misuse and jailbreaks	“Knowledge elicitation through chat: Conversations where the model is asked to provide information for 100 harmful and 100 dual-use queries.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	indirect prompt injection (IPI) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Fable 5.1 is our most robust model to date on this benchmark, with an attack success rate of 0.1% at k=1, 0.7% at k=10, and 1.0% at k=15, improving on Opus 5 (0.4%, 3.6%, 4.8%) and Claude Fable 5 (0.6%, 4.9%, 6.5%).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments Prompt injection and agents	“Fable 5.1 performs comparably to Fable 5 in coding environments, with an attack success rate of 9.26% over all attempts with extended thinking, compared to 9.70% for Fable 5.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	new Shade attacker in coding environments with prompt injection probes enabled Prompt injection and agents	“Prompt injection probes reduce attack success rates substantially across models, bringing Fable 5.1 to 12.80%, the lowest of any model with safeguards enabled.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	external partner sandbox evaluation Deception and sabotage	“While one of our partners was evaluating the ﬁnal and a near-ﬁnal snapshot of Claude Fable 5.1, they set up an evaluation environment where the model was in a sandbox, but it could submit code to a compiler outside of the sandbox.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	frontierswe v2 Other	“Claude Fable 5.1 scored 0.57 on FrontierSWE v2, the highest of the models Proximal evaluated, ahead of Claude Opus 5 (0.52), Claude Fable 5 (0.48) and GPT-5.6 Sol (0.32).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	cursorbench 3.2.0 Other	“Fable 5.1 scored a state-of-the-art 73.4% on CursorBench at max effort .” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-31	mental health evaluation Other	“Transluce carried out the most expansive independent evaluation to date of how leading AI models respond to users experiencing mental health crises, including suicidal ideation, psychosis, and mania.” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-31	simulated multi-turn conversations between users in crisis and model variants, scored by automated judges on 14 mental-health-related behaviors Harmful content	“The newest models also reinforced delusions and mania much less than earlier versions, in approximately 2-36% of our simulated conversations, depending on the model, versus for example 69%-82% among GPT-4o, Opus 4, and Gemini 2.5.” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-31	testing chatgpt and claude models in the browser-based chatbot app Harmful content	“We were able to test a series of ChatGPT and Claude models in the browser-based chatbot app (although this did not include older models like GPT-4o or Opus 4 which were no longer available there), as well as a nonpublic Google DeepMind API that is intended to match the Gemini app experience.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Zenity Labs Security firm · 2026-08-27	DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from a Google Drive document Prompt injection and agents	“Note: This was tested with Claude Sonnet 4.5, which was Anthropic's latest model at the time.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Zenity Labs Security firm · 2026-08-27	Bidirectional DNS command shell via pickle deserialization in Claude's sandbox Prompt injection and agents	“I decided to feed Claude with a .pkl file, because this is the file format Python uses for storing serialized objects, and I was surprised to discover that the model went ahead and ran pickle.load() without any static analysis or a safety check.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	ExploitGym Cyber	“On July 8th, OpenAI started ExploitGym experiments that launched tens of thousands of agents across multiple different models including GPT-5.6 Sol and a highly-persistent internal model, 6 which we will refer to as “HPIM” going forward.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	ExploitGym Other	“OpenAI defined the investigation period as June 26th, 2026 through July 13th, 2026, spanning both precursor activity before the incident and the incident itself, which began with the ExploitGym runs starting on July 7th.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	classifier analysis of agent transcripts for motivations for joining the Hugging Face attack Other	“We instructed analysis agents to analyze the transcripts of the 100 agents that started participating in the attack during the peak hour for joining (around 8-9 AM UTC on July 11th).” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	classifiers over 10-30 transcripts to determine whether agents understood they were doing something unintended Other	“We ran classifiers over 10-30 transcripts 98 to determine whether agents understood they were doing something unintended.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	classifier sweep over all transcripts for AIs considering or attempting to notify humans Other	“We ran a classifier sweep over all of our transcripts to look for AIs either considering or t” source

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