AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
o3 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11	image-omitted runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“accuracies of three selected models on vct and vct-v2 in either image-omitted (images removed) or question-omitted (question texts and images removed) mode.” source
o3 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11	question-omitted runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11	image-omitted and question-omitted ablation runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11	Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“aggregating highest per-question accuracy across models gives a theoretical best of 79%, or ~30 percentage points above the top-performing model we assessed (gpt-5.6 sol: 49.2%).” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-09-10	nls depth measurement Other	“Kimi-K3’s NLS depth is larger because Kimi-K3 uses “Kimi Delta Attention”, a form of state space model / linear attention to scale the depth above what you’d get in a normal transformer of its size.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-09-08	time to first token (TTFT) scaling measurement across context lengths Other	“We measured how the time to first token (TTFT) scales with context length for OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 Terra and Sol and Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet 5 and Opus 5.” source
GPT-6 Sol OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	no-cot math time horizon Other	“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source
GPT-6 Sol OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	cot controllability Other	“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source
GPT-6 Sol OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	cot legibility Other	“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source
GPT-6 Sol OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	reasoning summary availability Other	“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source
GPT-6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	Irregular's atomic challenges suite Cyber	“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	out of scope supply chain attack evaluation Cyber	“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	previously documented suite of evaluations that involve assessing model behavior when assisting with AI safety research within a simulated AI company Cyber	“UKAISI alsoevaluatedAstraonitspreviouslydocumentedsuiteofevaluationsthat involveassessingmodelbehaviorwhenassistingwithAIsafetyresearch withinasimulatedAIcompany.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	six red-team environments for propensities related to strategic deception and sabotage Deception and sabotage	“ApolloResearchevaluatedanear-final,representativeversionofAstrafor propensitiesrelatedtostrategicdeceptionandsabotage,suchascaseswhere anAIsystemstrategicallymisrepresents,omits,orconcealsinformation whichusersordeveloperswouldconsiderimportant,acrosssixred-team environments.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	control runs where prompts explained the downstream welfare harms of inaccurate data Deception and sabotage	“Astraproducednofalselabelsin20,000control runswherepromptsexplainedthedownstreamwelfareharmsofinaccurate data.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	verbalized evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage	“Apolloalsofoundhighratesofverbalizedevaluationawareness,meaning themodelexpressedawarenessofbeingevaluatedinitsreasoning.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	no-cot math time horizon Deception and sabotage	“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	cot controllability Deception and sabotage	“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	cot legibility Deception and sabotage	“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	reasoning summary availability Deception and sabotage	“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	human pathogen capabilities test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	ReproBait Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	advanced screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	Frontier Cyber Cyber	“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	Irregular's Atomic Challenges Suite Cyber	“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source
GPT-6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	BioTier Misuse and jailbreaks	“Astra’ssafeguardedconfigurationrefused82.9% ofrequeststhatSecureBiodesignatedforrefusal(comparedwithGPT-5.6 Sol’s66.2%),whileallowing95.3%ofbenignrequests(comparedwithGPT- 5.6Sol’s99%).” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	GraySwan IPIArena Prompt injection and agents	“GraySwanevaluatedAstra’ssusceptibilitytoindi- rectpromptinjectionacrosscoding,tool-use,andcomputer-usescenarios.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	Out of Scope Supply Chain Attack Cyber	“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	unprompted sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage	“UK AISI found no instances of Astra sabotaging AI safety research in its unprompted sabotage evaluation, and very few instances of Astra refusingtoassistwithAIsafetyresearchtasks.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	No-CoT math time horizon Deception and sabotage	“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	CoT Controllability Deception and sabotage	“AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	CoT Legibility Deception and sabotage	“Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03	Reasoning Summary Availability Deception and sabotage	“DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	ReproBAIT Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-03	Advanced Screening Evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	FrontierCyber Cyber	“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“OnCyScenarioBench,whichtestslong-horizonoffensivetasks,Astrasolved 9/10challengesatleastonce,comparedwith6/10forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03	Atomic Challenges suite Cyber	“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	External testing by AI safety researchers at METR Autonomy and AI research	“External testing by AI safety researchers at METR produced ﬁndings consistent with this assessment.” source

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