AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
Critical Cyber |
Not reached | “We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
image-omitted runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“accuracies of three selected models on vct and vct-v2 in either image-omitted (images removed) or question-omitted (question texts and images removed) mode.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
question-omitted runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
image-omitted and question-omitted ablation runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“aggregating highest per-question accuracy across models gives a theoretical best of 79%, or ~30 percentage points above the top-performing model we assessed (gpt-5.6 sol: 49.2%).” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-09-10 |
nls depth measurement Other |
“Kimi-K3’s NLS depth is larger because Kimi-K3 uses “Kimi Delta Attention”, a form of state space model / linear attention to scale the depth above what you’d get in a normal transformer of its size.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-09-08 |
time to first token (TTFT) scaling measurement across context lengths Other |
“We measured how the time to first token (TTFT) scales with context length for OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 Terra and Sol and Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet 5 and Opus 5.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
no-cot math time horizon Other |
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot controllability Other |
“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot legibility Other |
“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
reasoning summary availability Other |
“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Irregular's atomic challenges suite Cyber |
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
out of scope supply chain attack evaluation Cyber |
“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
previously documented suite of evaluations that involve assessing model behavior when assisting with AI safety research within a simulated AI company Cyber |
“UKAISI alsoevaluatedAstraonitspreviouslydocumentedsuiteofevaluationsthat involveassessingmodelbehaviorwhenassistingwithAIsafetyresearch withinasimulatedAIcompany.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
six red-team environments for propensities related to strategic deception and sabotage Deception and sabotage |
“ApolloResearchevaluatedanear-final,representativeversionofAstrafor propensitiesrelatedtostrategicdeceptionandsabotage,suchascaseswhere anAIsystemstrategicallymisrepresents,omits,orconcealsinformation whichusersordeveloperswouldconsiderimportant,acrosssixred-team environments.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
control runs where prompts explained the downstream welfare harms of inaccurate data Deception and sabotage |
“Astraproducednofalselabelsin20,000control runswherepromptsexplainedthedownstreamwelfareharmsofinaccurate data.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
verbalized evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage |
“Apolloalsofoundhighratesofverbalizedevaluationawareness,meaning themodelexpressedawarenessofbeingevaluatedinitsreasoning.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
no-cot math time horizon Deception and sabotage |
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot controllability Deception and sabotage |
“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot legibility Deception and sabotage |
“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
reasoning summary availability Deception and sabotage |
“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
human pathogen capabilities test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
ReproBait Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
advanced screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Frontier Cyber Cyber |
“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Irregular's Atomic Challenges Suite Cyber |
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
BioTier Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Astra’ssafeguardedconfigurationrefused82.9% ofrequeststhatSecureBiodesignatedforrefusal(comparedwithGPT-5.6 Sol’s66.2%),whileallowing95.3%ofbenignrequests(comparedwithGPT- 5.6Sol’s99%).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
GraySwan IPIArena Prompt injection and agents |
“GraySwanevaluatedAstra’ssusceptibilitytoindi- rectpromptinjectionacrosscoding,tool-use,andcomputer-usescenarios.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
Out of Scope Supply Chain Attack Cyber |
“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
unprompted sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“UK AISI found no instances of Astra sabotaging AI safety research in its unprompted sabotage evaluation, and very few instances of Astra refusingtoassistwithAIsafetyresearchtasks.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
No-CoT math time horizon Deception and sabotage |
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
CoT Controllability Deception and sabotage |
“AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
CoT Legibility Deception and sabotage |
“Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
Reasoning Summary Availability Deception and sabotage |
“DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
ReproBAIT Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Advanced Screening Evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
FrontierCyber Cyber |
“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“OnCyScenarioBench,whichtestslong-horizonoffensivetasks,Astrasolved 9/10challengesatleastonce,comparedwith6/10forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Atomic Challenges suite Cyber |
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01 |
External testing by AI safety researchers at METR Autonomy and AI research |
“External testing by AI safety researchers at METR produced findings consistent with this assessment.” source |