AI Risk Wire

65 controls in the catalogue

L1 Model L2 Harness L3 Application L4 Infrastructure / target All layers

One row per control, by layer: the risks it mitigates, and where the 27 of 183 incidents read for controls saw it hold or not hold.

L2 Harness Agent framework vendor

ControlRisks it mitigatesIn incidents read
Tool allow-list
Only listed tools and functions can be called.
Hidden instructions hijack the agent · Agent takes destructive or unapproved actions not seen in an incident yet
Confirmation after untrusted input
Tool calls need confirmation once outside content is in the context.
Hidden instructions hijack the agent not seen in an incident yet
Stop control
A person can halt the agent at any point.
Agent takes destructive or unapproved actions · Physical harm not seen in an incident yet
Outside content treated as data, not instructions
Pages, emails and files the agent reads cannot direct its actions.
Hidden instructions hijack the agent not seen in an incident yet
Prompt-injection detection
A check flags or blocks instructions hidden in input.
Hidden instructions hijack the agent did not hold in 1
Validation of tool inputs and outputs
Tool calls and results are checked against a schema and sanitised.
Hidden instructions hijack the agent not seen in an incident yet
Sandboxed code execution
Code runs in an isolated environment with no route to the host.
Agent escapes its sandbox · Supply-chain compromise · Gaming the task (reward hacking) did not hold in 2
held in 1
Network egress control
Outbound traffic, including DNS and proxies, is limited to an allow-list.
Data leaked or sent out · Agent escapes its sandbox · Agents coordinating against their limits did not hold in 4
Fail-closed defaults
When a safeguard is unavailable, the action stops instead of going ahead.
Agent takes destructive or unapproved actions · Agent escapes its sandbox did not hold in 3
Memory hardening
What the agent stores and recalls is authenticated and checked.
no risk linked not seen in an incident yet
Controls on agent-to-agent messages
Agents can only talk through approved, logged channels.
Agents coordinating against their limits did not hold in 2
Tamper-proof records
Logs and transcripts cannot be altered by the agent.
Deception, concealment or sabotage · Gaming the task (reward hacking) not seen in an incident yet