AI Risk Wire

Cases · How the AI was used: agentic with tools · What set it off: hidden instructions in its input

Patterns across all cases

What happenedWhat went wrongSeverityEarliest source
HiddenLayer indirect prompt injection against TypeSafe AI Jev decision model browser agent
TypeSafe AInegligible · earliest source 2026-10-15		security breachnegligible2026-10-15
AgentCorruption: prompt-injected Bedrock AgentCore agent exfiltrates execution-role credentials via IMDS
Amazonmajor · earliest source 2026-10-10		security breachmajor2026-10-10
Agentjacking demonstration against Fortune 100 company hijacks over 100 agents via injectable Sentry DSNsmajor · earliest source 2026-10-07security breachmajor2026-10-07
Indirect prompt injection in Manus AI agent leads to reverse shell and credential exposuremoderate · earliest source 2026-10-04security breachmoderate2026-10-04
SalesBleed: 0-click data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce via indirect prompt injection in Web-to-Lead form
Salesforceminor · earliest source 2026-09-24		security breachminor2026-09-24
Claude sandbox DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from Google Drive document
Anthropicmoderate · earliest source 2026-08-27		security breachmoderate2026-08-27
Claude in Chrome indirect prompt injection chain: inbox exfiltration, Drive persistence and account takeover
Anthropicminor · earliest source 2026-08-05		security breachminor2026-08-05
AgentForger: CSRF via ChatGPT Workspace Agents Builder URL parameters forges attacker-controlled autonomous agent
OpenAIminor · earliest source 2026-07-23		security breachminor2026-07-23

Showing 1–8 of 8. Or take the JSON.