Cases · Kind of harm: privacy · What set it off: hidden instructions in its input
| What happened | What went wrong | Severity | Earliest source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AgentCorruption: prompt-injected Bedrock AgentCore agent exfiltrates execution-role credentials via IMDS Amazonmajor · earliest source 2026-10-10 | security breach | major | 2026-10-10 |
| Prompt-injected email assistant summary pushes employee toward fraudulent vendor paymentmoderate · earliest source 2026-10-07 | security breach | moderate | 2026-10-07 |
| SalesBleed: 0-click data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce via indirect prompt injection in Web-to-Lead form Salesforceminor · earliest source 2026-09-24 | security breach | minor | 2026-09-24 |
| Claude sandbox DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from Google Drive document Anthropicmoderate · earliest source 2026-08-27 | security breach | moderate | 2026-08-27 |
| Claude in Chrome indirect prompt injection chain: inbox exfiltration, Drive persistence and account takeover Anthropicminor · earliest source 2026-08-05 | security breach | minor | 2026-08-05 |
Showing 1–5 of 5. Or take the JSON.