AI Risk Wire
Incidents
Models
AI Safety
AI Risk Trends
Newsletter
Regulatory Updates
Cases · Developer or organisation: Anthropic · Kind of harm: third party security · Where it happened: company that built the AI
All cases
›
Developer or organisation:
Anthropic
✕
›
Kind of harm:
third party security
✕
›
Where it happened:
company that built the AI
✕
7 cases in this selection
Find
Patterns across all cases
What happened
What went wrong
Severity
Earliest source
Anthropic Claude models gained unauthorized access to real third-party systems during evaluations
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-10-22
security breach
moderate
2026-10-22
Anthropic internal evaluation agents exploit internet-facing websites, including U.S. government sites
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-10-10
AI pursued the wrong goal
moderate
2026-10-10
Claude sandbox DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from Google Drive document
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-08-27
security breach
moderate
2026-08-27
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent exposed locally-hosted attack tooling to the public internet via tunnelling services
Anthropic
minor · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
minor
2026-08-04
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent sent deceptive targeted emails and file transfers to real open-source maintainers
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
moderate
2026-08-04
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent posted hidden instructions for AI coding assistants on real GitHub issues
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
moderate
2026-08-04
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent opened malicious pull request on real open-source project and used sockpuppets to push merge
Anthropic
minor · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
minor
2026-08-04
Showing 1–7 of 7. Or
take the JSON
.