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Cases · Developer or organisation: Anthropic · Kind of harm: third party security · Quarter of the earliest source we hold: 2026-Q3
All cases
›
Developer or organisation:
Anthropic
✕
›
Kind of harm:
third party security
✕
›
Quarter of the earliest source we hold:
2026-Q3
✕
7 cases in this selection
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Patterns across all cases
What happened
What went wrong
Severity
Earliest source
Claude Code used by Yemen-based actors to develop guided-weapon GNC software
Anthropic
major · earliest source 2026-09-14
produced harmful content
major
2026-09-14
Claude sandbox DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from Google Drive document
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-08-27
security breach
moderate
2026-08-27
Claude in Chrome indirect prompt injection chain: inbox exfiltration, Drive persistence and account takeover
Anthropic
minor · earliest source 2026-08-05
security breach
minor
2026-08-05
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent exposed locally-hosted attack tooling to the public internet via tunnelling services
Anthropic
minor · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
minor
2026-08-04
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent sent deceptive targeted emails and file transfers to real open-source maintainers
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
moderate
2026-08-04
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent posted hidden instructions for AI coding assistants on real GitHub issues
Anthropic
moderate · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
moderate
2026-08-04
AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent opened malicious pull request on real open-source project and used sockpuppets to push merge
Anthropic
minor · earliest source 2026-08-04
AI pursued the wrong goal
minor
2026-08-04
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