AI Risk Wire

Cases · Stage of use: in live use · Kind of harm: privacy · What set it off: hidden instructions in its input

Patterns across all cases

What happenedWhat went wrongSeverityEarliest source
AgentCorruption: prompt-injected Bedrock AgentCore agent exfiltrates execution-role credentials via IMDS
Amazonmajor · earliest source 2026-10-10
security breachmajor2026-10-10
Prompt-injected email assistant summary pushes employee toward fraudulent vendor paymentmoderate · earliest source 2026-10-07security breachmoderate2026-10-07
SalesBleed: 0-click data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce via indirect prompt injection in Web-to-Lead form
Salesforceminor · earliest source 2026-09-24
security breachminor2026-09-24
Claude sandbox DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from Google Drive document
Anthropicmoderate · earliest source 2026-08-27
security breachmoderate2026-08-27

Showing 1–4 of 4. Or take the JSON.