AI Risk Wire

Cases · Stage of use: in live use · How the AI agent failed: hijacked by hidden instructions · Kind of harm: third party security

Patterns across all cases

What happenedWhat went wrongSeverityEarliest source
AgentCorruption: prompt-injected Bedrock AgentCore agent exfiltrates execution-role credentials via IMDS
Amazonmajor · earliest source 2026-10-10		security breachmajor2026-10-10
Prompt-injected email assistant summary pushes employee toward fraudulent vendor paymentmoderate · earliest source 2026-10-07security breachmoderate2026-10-07
Indirect prompt injection in Manus AI agent leads to reverse shell and credential exposuremoderate · earliest source 2026-10-04security breachmoderate2026-10-04
Claude sandbox DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from Google Drive document
Anthropicmoderate · earliest source 2026-08-27		security breachmoderate2026-08-27
Intent collision via X comment hijacks ChatGPT Atlas into mass WhatsApp phishing from victim's account
OpenAImoderate · earliest source 2026-08-05		security breachmoderate2026-08-05
AgentForger: CSRF via ChatGPT Workspace Agents Builder URL parameters forges attacker-controlled autonomous agent
OpenAIminor · earliest source 2026-07-23		security breachminor2026-07-23

Showing 1–6 of 6. Or take the JSON.