Cases · Did an AI agent act: yes · Severity: minor · What set it off: hidden instructions in its input
| What happened | What went wrong | Severity | Earliest source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indirect prompt injection attempts embedded in HTTP response headers across websitesminor · earliest source 2026-10-16 | security breach | minor | 2026-10-16 |
| SalesBleed: 0-click data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce via indirect prompt injection in Web-to-Lead form Salesforceminor · earliest source 2026-09-24 | security breach | minor | 2026-09-24 |
| Claude in Chrome indirect prompt injection chain: inbox exfiltration, Drive persistence and account takeover Anthropicminor · earliest source 2026-08-05 | security breach | minor | 2026-08-05 |
| AgentForger: CSRF via ChatGPT Workspace Agents Builder URL parameters forges attacker-controlled autonomous agent OpenAIminor · earliest source 2026-07-23 | security breach | minor | 2026-07-23 |
Showing 1–4 of 4. Or take the JSON.