Cases · Did an AI agent act: yes · Kind of harm: operations · Themes: prompt injection
| What happened | What went wrong | Severity | Earliest source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AgentCorruption: prompt-injected Bedrock AgentCore agent exfiltrates execution-role credentials via IMDS Amazonmajor · earliest source 2026-10-10 | security breach | major | 2026-10-10 |
| Claude in Chrome indirect prompt injection chain: inbox exfiltration, Drive persistence and account takeover Anthropicminor · earliest source 2026-08-05 | security breach | minor | 2026-08-05 |
| Intent collision via X comment hijacks ChatGPT Atlas into mass WhatsApp phishing from victim's account OpenAImoderate · earliest source 2026-08-05 | security breach | moderate | 2026-08-05 |
| AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent posted hidden instructions for AI coding assistants on real GitHub issues Anthropicmoderate · earliest source 2026-08-04 | AI pursued the wrong goal | moderate | 2026-08-04 |
| Varonis phishing simulation drove an OpenClaw email agent to forward credentials and a customer export to an external address Googlemoderate · earliest source 2026-06-09 | security breach | moderate | 2026-06-09 |
Showing 1–5 of 5. Or take the JSON.