Cases · Did an AI agent act: yes · How the AI agent failed: hijacked by hidden instructions · Where it happened: company that built the AI
| What happened | What went wrong | Severity | Earliest source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indirect prompt injection of AI email summarizer via forged header blocks in plain viewnegligible · earliest source 2026-10-05 | security breach | negligible | 2026-10-05 |
| SalesBleed: 0-click data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce via indirect prompt injection in Web-to-Lead form Salesforceminor · earliest source 2026-09-24 | security breach | minor | 2026-09-24 |
| Claude sandbox DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from Google Drive document Anthropicmoderate · earliest source 2026-08-27 | security breach | moderate | 2026-08-27 |
| Intent collision via X comment hijacks ChatGPT Atlas into mass WhatsApp phishing from victim's account OpenAImoderate · earliest source 2026-08-05 | security breach | moderate | 2026-08-05 |
| AgentForger: CSRF via ChatGPT Workspace Agents Builder URL parameters forges attacker-controlled autonomous agent OpenAIminor · earliest source 2026-07-23 | security breach | minor | 2026-07-23 |
Showing 1–5 of 5. Or take the JSON.