Cases · Date of the earliest source we hold: last 30 days · How the AI agent failed: hijacked by hidden instructions · Added to the register (date we first published it): today
| What happened | What went wrong | Severity | Earliest source |
|---|---|---|---|
| HiddenLayer indirect prompt injection against TypeSafe AI Jev decision model browser agent TypeSafe AInegligible · earliest source 2026-10-15 | security breach | negligible | 2026-10-15 |
| AgentCorruption: prompt-injected Bedrock AgentCore agent exfiltrates execution-role credentials via IMDS Amazonmajor · earliest source 2026-10-10 | security breach | major | 2026-10-10 |
| Prompt-injected email assistant summary pushes employee toward fraudulent vendor paymentmoderate · earliest source 2026-10-07 | security breach | moderate | 2026-10-07 |
| Indirect prompt injection of AI email summarizer via forged header blocks in plain viewnegligible · earliest source 2026-10-05 | security breach | negligible | 2026-10-05 |
| Indirect prompt injection in Manus AI agent leads to reverse shell and credential exposuremoderate · earliest source 2026-10-04 | security breach | moderate | 2026-10-04 |
Showing 1–5 of 5. Or take the JSON.