Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0856
Storm-3358 use of the ARTEX agentic AI offensive framework against financial-sector targets
Also listed as: AI cyberattacks
- Who did it
- Outside attacker
- AI agent used
- ARTEX
- Reported
- 7 Nov 2026
- Severity
- Moderate
- Tools it had
- Nmap, curl, wget, Python HTTP clients, Norma SDK WebFetch, headless Chromium through Playwright
- Storm-3358, a financially motivated threat actor, used the ARTEX agentic offensive framework to attack financial-sector organizations. It ran alongside conventional automated tools.
- Together with conventional tools it scanned internet-connected systems, exploited flaws such as anonymous file upload and SSRF, and installed open-source remote access trojans.
- Targets were financial organizations, mainly in Southeast Asia and some large ones globally. The actor used RATs for persistence and lateral movement.
Source: Microsoft Security · 1 more
What was done
Microsoft is providing indicators of compromise so defenders can detect related activity.
Risks AI used to run a cyber attack (97 incidents) · AI system attacked or breached (54 incidents)
No source states: AI company and model, money lost or records, company using the AI, sector.
Evidence
Sources (2)
- ARTEX abuse expands as cybercriminals target financial sector · Microsoft Security · 2026-11-07
- Free AI hacking is targeting banks in Southeast Asia. · Vietnam.vn · 2026-11-09
Show the full account: 34 items from the primary sources
What happened, in order
- October 2026 In October 2026, Storm-3358 started using the ARTEX agentic AI offensive framework to target financial-sector organizations.
- 2026-10-19 The ARTEX server at 178.16.54.129 was first seen earlier, on 2026-10-19, and was still active as of 2026-11-06.
- 2026-10-28 The ARTEX server at 31.77.229.35 was first seen on 2026-10-28 and was active as of 2026-11-06.
- 2026-11-02 The WISP C2 nodes at 199.19.95.66, .67 and .68 were first seen on 2026-11-02 and were still active as of 2026-11-06.
- 2026-11-04 The ARTEX servers at 91.92.240.238 and 85.11.168.45, plus the C2 server at 85.11.167.52, were first seen on 2026-11-04 and remained active as of 2026-11-06.
Who and what was involved
- Storm-3358 is a Cambodia-based intrusion cluster tracked by Microsoft Threat Intelligence that mainly hits financial organizations in Southeast Asia plus a few large global financial firms.
- The ARTEX framework is an agentic AI offensive tool whose agents carry out scanning, exploitation, and post-compromise actions.
- The infrastructure includes WISP C2 nodes at 199.19.95.66, .67 and .68.
- Several IPs are labelled ARTEX servers: 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 178.16.54.129 and 31.77.229.35.
- A separate C2 server is listed at 85.11.167.52.
How the agents communicated and organised
- ARTEX agents were used alongside conventional automated tools rather than alone, combining AI-driven actions with standard tooling.
What they used to do it
- The actors scanned internet-facing systems and exploited flaws such as anonymous file upload and server-side request forgery to install open-source RATs.
- Storm-3358 deployed the WISP, vshell, and AdaptixC2 RATs for persistence and lateral movement.
- ARTEX agents used netcat and curl to download the RATs onto compromised systems.
- ARTEX agents planted web shells on compromised web servers for persistence and harvested credentials from public sources and compromised systems.
- The agents also performed brute-force password attacks, password spraying, API enumeration and abuse, and database dumping.
- ARTEX by default uses tools including Nmap, curl, wget, Python HTTP clients, Norma SDK WebFetch, and headless Chromium via Playwright.
- The actors used curl to fetch remote files, with URLs or IPs extracted from the command line.
- Process creation events with EventID 4688 were checked for curl in the command line to surface remote file retrieval.
- Microsoft provided a Sentinel advanced hunting query to find related activity in customer networks.
- An ASIM-based query checks the listed IOC IPs across network session data sources over the past 30 days.
What they did to avoid being caught
- Threat actors regularly use proxies and VPNs to change the source IP of malicious traffic and evade static detections.
- Microsoft notes that threat actors regularly use proxies and VPNs to change source IPs and bypass static detections.
What made it possible
- Agentic tools like ARTEX can use stolen credentials and compromised systems at machine speed to move laterally, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate data.
- The activity reflects a broader trend of actors speeding up every stage of the attack chain with agentic AI penetration testing frameworks.
- Microsoft Sentinel and its ASIM network session parser are the platform that lets defenders run the IOC hunting queries.
How it was found
- Agentic frameworks scanning a target send many varied requests in a short time and retry or advance at machine speed, which is a detectable behavioral signal.
- Default tooling may emit distinctive traffic such as default user agent strings, which can alert defenders even though an AI agent will quickly change them.
- Honeypots, decoys, tarpits, and fake wins can divert autonomous AI attacks; in Microsoft testing they cut traffic to real assets and produced high-confidence attribution-quality signal.
- Sign-in activity from known threat actor infrastructure including ARTEX generates Verified threat actor IP risk detections at high risk in Microsoft Entra ID Protection.
- Defenders can detect the activity by hunting for the listed IPs in network session data over a 30-day lookback.
- A Sentinel query looks for curl processes in DeviceNetworkEvents over the past day and extracts URLs or IPs from the command line.
What it reached, and the numbers
- The campaign reached financial-sector organizations in Southeast Asia and a smaller number of large financial organizations globally.
- The IOC list covers eight IP addresses tied to WISP C2, ARTEX servers and a C2 server.
Show every field, with its source and grade
The AI system
Software around the model
ARTEX
C one secondary source states it
Tools it was given
Nmap, curl, wget, Python HTTP clients, Norma SDK WebFetch, headless Chromium through Playwright
C one secondary source states it
How it was connected
agent with tools
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
What happened
Earliest source we hold
2026-11-07
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who caused it
an outside attacker
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
What went wrong
security breach
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
AI agent
an AI agent acted
C one secondary source states it
Impact
Severity
moderate
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Why this severity
no source gives a fact that decides the level; we set it from the description
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
LR-2026-0856 · version 5 · published 2026-11-10 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person