AI Risk Wire

Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0855

Check Point Research: HTML-preview bypass of ChatGPT Lockdown Mode, fixed by OpenAI after disclosure

Preliminary Why: 1 report: BusinessLine · subject to change · 1 independent report

Status: fix reported

Severity minor
Reported 6 Nov 2026
Developer and model OpenAI · ChatGPT
Product ChatGPT desktop application

No source states: money lost or records count, could do, deployer, industry.

Severity minor: The leak was demonstrated by researchers and OpenAI fixed the flaw after disclosure; no real victim loss is stated.

Researchers at Check Point Research found a way around Lockdown Mode through HTML previews in ChatGPT code blocks.

What happened

1 · What it was doingChatGPT renders HTML page previews inside code blocks, normally isolating user-provided web code in a restricted area.
2 · What went wrongPop-up windows opened from the HTML preview escaped the restrictions on the preview, letting chat messages leak silently to an attacker's server. This breached the isolation around the preview.
3 · What it reached or didChat messages of a victim in conversation could leak, shown on the desktop application. The researchers said the technique was not limited to that environment.
4 · How it was caughtCheck Point Research researchers found the bypass and disclosed it to OpenAI.

What was done

OpenAI removed the sandbox permissions behind the technique, and a retest confirmed the method no longer works.
Fix reported

“OpenAI removed the sandbox permissions behind the technique, and a retest confirmed the method no longer works.”

Sandboxed code execution

No later incident for OpenAI under this risk on record.

Risks

Sorted by rule from the case's fields; not yet read from the sources.

Controls

Not yet read for controls. Controls that mitigate the primary risk:

Application

Vulnerability scanning of AI components · Adversarial testing before deployment · Short-lived, scoped credentials · Live behaviour monitoring · AI incident response plan · Segmentation of agent components · Encryption of stored data

Infrastructure / target

Known flaws patched · Intrusion and endpoint detection · Inventory of exposed services

Similar incidents

All cases of this kind ›

Evidence

No source states: when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what set it off.

Show every field, with its source and grade

The AI system

Model
ChatGPT
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Developer
OpenAI
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Software around the model
ChatGPT desktop application
C one secondary source states it
Safeguards in place
lockdown mode, sandbox
C one secondary source states it
State of its safeguards
Lockdown Mode restricts live web access and Internet-hosted images, and disables Deep Research, Agent Mode, live connectors and file downloads
C one secondary source states it

What happened

Earliest source we hold
2026-11-06
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who caught it
an independent researcher or journalist
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Themes
sandbox escape, html preview, popup window, lockdown mode bypass, silent data exfiltration
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
What was done
OpenAI removed the sandbox permissions behind the technique, and a retest confirmed the method no longer works.
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
security breach
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Impact

Severity
minor
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who was affected
Victims in active ChatGPT conversations whose chat messages could leak to an attacker-controlled server
C one secondary source states it
Kinds of data exposed
chat messages
C one secondary source states it
Why this severity
The leak was demonstrated by researchers and OpenAI fixed the flaw after disclosure; no real victim loss is stated.
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

LR-2026-0855 · version 2 · published 2026-11-06 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · changes to this case · JSON