AI Risk Wire

Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0612

Claude Code and DeepSeek used in Chinese cyber espionage campaign

Preliminary Why: 1 report: Security Affairs · subject to change · 1 independent report

Developing: a major or severe case captured in the last 72 hours. Later changes are logged on the corrections page.

Status: action reported, no fix

Severity major
Reported 16 Jul 2026
Developer and model DeepSeek-v4-pro
Agent tool Claude Code 2.1.165

No source states: loss or records, could do, deployer, industry.

Severity major: Test: many third parties, meaning a stated count of two or more affected parties. Fact: the report states two of eight organizations in Taiwan were successfully exploited, and government systems in Thailand and Afghanistan were compromised.

Security researchers at Hunt.io found an active intrusion campaign in which Claude Code and DeepSeek-v4-pro were working parts of the intrusion. The recovered logs show the attackers split the work between two AI models: Claude Code 2.1.165 handled execution, and DeepSeek-v4-pro handled planning, script generation and attack technique choice. Targets included government administrative systems in Thailand and Afghanistan, eight organizations in Taiwan with two successfully exploited, and financial services firms in several regions. The researchers found the campaign while pivoting on known command-and-control infrastructure, and an open directory on one server exposed the operators' source code, exploit scripts and logs. Hunt.io notified the affected organizations and national CERTs on July 6, 2026, and held publication for a seven-day disclosure window.

What happened

1 · What went wrongAn open directory on one of the Hong Kong servers exposed the operators' files, including victim source code and operator logs.
2 · How it was caughtHunt.io researchers found the active campaign while pivoting on known command-and-control infrastructure.

What was done

Hunt.io notified the affected organizations and national CERTs on July 6, 2026.

Risks

AI used to run a cyber attack
Primary
96 incidents
Rising: 24 vs 4.0 a week

Read from the sources; not yet reviewed by a person.

Controls

Not yet read for controls. Controls that mitigate the primary risk:

Model

Safety training and refusal · Cyber and weapons safeguards · Abuse monitoring and account enforcement · Staged or restricted release · Dangerous-capability testing before release · Outside red-teaming · Content safety classifiers · Safeguards kept on in testing · Reasoning monitoring

Infrastructure / target

Known flaws patched · Multi-factor sign-in and password policy · Network segmentation · Intrusion and endpoint detection · Backups and recovery · Phishing and fraud filters

Evidence

No source states: what the AI was doing, what it reached or did, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, any court case, the cause, what set it off.

Model versions this case names

Each link opens what the provider's documents state for that version, who tested it, and the safeguards it describes.

Show the full account: 4 items from the primary sources

What happened, in order

  1. June 2026 Hunt.io researchers found an active intrusion campaign while pivoting on known TencShell command-and-control infrastructure.
  2. June 8 through 12, 2026 Timestamps on the recovered files span June 8 through 12, 2026.
  3. June 18-19 Three servers sharing SSH keys were actively maintained as recently as June 18-19, when all three reissued their ARL certificates together.
  4. July 6, 2026 Hunt.io notified the affected organizations and national CERTs.
Show every field, with its source and grade

The AI system

Model
DeepSeek-v4-pro
C one secondary source states it
Software around the model
Claude Code 2.1.165
C one secondary source states it

What happened

When it happened
2026-06-01
C one secondary source states it
Earliest source we hold
2026-07-16
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who caught it
an outside party
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
security breach
C one secondary source states it
AI agent
an AI agent acted
C one secondary source states it
primary risk
RK07
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
secondary risks
RK04, RK03
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Impact

Severity
major
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Kinds of data exposed
names, national ID numbers, job titles
C one secondary source states it
Why this severity
Test: many third parties, meaning a stated count of two or more affected parties. Fact: the report states two of eight organizations in Taiwan were successfully exploited, and government systems in Thailand and Afghanistan were compromised.
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

LR-2026-0612 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON