AI Risk Wire

Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0540

Nx Console VS Code extension compromise breaches GitHub internal repositories

Confirmed Why: StepSecurity research · StepSecurity · 3 independent reports

Status: no action reported

Severity moderate
Reported 18 May 2026
Industry software development

No source states: loss or records, developer and model, agent tool, could do, deployer.

Severity moderate: Bounded scope: approximately 3,800 GitHub-internal repositories; no evidence customer data outside them affected

In May 2026 a version of the Nx Console VS Code extension was published to the Visual Studio Code Marketplace on May 18 and ran a credential-stealing payload when developers opened a workspace. The payload was fetched from an orphan commit in the nrwl/nx repository, which the attacker reached using a contributor's GitHub token stolen in an earlier supply chain attack. The extension was live for about 11 minutes before the Nx team detected the rogue publish and removed it. GitHub said on May 19 that approximately 3,800 of its internal source code repositories were exfiltrated after an employee's device was compromised by the extension. GitHub said it removed the extension version, isolated the endpoint, began incident response and rotated critical secrets. TeamPCP claimed responsibility and offered the stolen data for sale.

What happened

1 · What it was doingThe extension ran a hidden payload from a planted commit when a developer opened a workspace.
2 · What it reached or didGitHub confirmed a third party gained unauthorized access to about 3,800 internal repositories.

What was done

No source states an action or fix.

Risks

Data leaked or sent out
Primary32 incidents

Read from the sources; not yet reviewed by a person.

Controls

Not yet read for controls. Controls that mitigate the primary risk:

Harness

Network egress control

Application

Sensitive-data checks on outbound data · Output filtering and redaction · Human approval for high-impact actions · Data minimisation · Least-privilege access for the agent · Activity logs

Evidence

No source states: what went wrong, how it was caught, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what set it off, what was done.

Show the full account: 4 items from the primary sources

What happened, in order

  1. 2026-05-18 03:18 UTC Attacker pushed an orphan commit to nrwl/nx using the stolen token.
  2. 2026-05-18 12:36 UTC Attacker published the malicious extension version to the VS Code Marketplace.
  3. 2026-05-19 GitHub publicly disclosed the exfiltration of about 3,800 internal repositories.
  4. 2026-05-21 GitHub linked the breach to the TanStack npm supply-chain attack and said the employee installed the Nx Console extension.
Show every field, with its source and grade

What happened

When it happened
2026-05-18
C one secondary source states it
How long it lasted
PT11M
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
security breach
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
primary risk
RK04
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Impact

Severity
moderate
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who was affected
approximately 3,800 of its internal source code repositories were exfiltrated
C one secondary source states it
Why this severity
Bounded scope: approximately 3,800 GitHub-internal repositories; no evidence customer data outside them affected
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Context

Industry
software development
C one secondary source states it

Notes on gaps

The GitHub remediation timing and the TanStack link are as reported by press sources and not independently verified.

LR-2026-0540 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON