AI Risk Wire

Cases › operational mistake › LR-2026-0474

Quebec Project UNIR social assistance algorithm failing vulnerable claimants

Preliminary Why: Publisher not yet named · subject to change

Status: no action reported

Severity moderate
Reported 26 Mar 2026

No source states: loss or records, developer and model, agent tool, could do, deployer, industry.

Severity moderate: tier: data and services of others touched, with a bounded scope stated as the eight-month window from February to September 2025

The Quebec Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity launched Project UNIR in 2025, a $31.5-million digital overhaul of the social assistance system built around an algorithm, with the stated aim to simplify and humanize services. Files were split into digital tasks handled by agents across regions instead of a single assigned official. Between February and September 2025, nearly 150,000 calls were rejected and another 94,000 were abandoned, according to ministry data. One recipient, Martine Decoste, says a past administrative error has led the province to reclaim money she has already paid. The ministry's office said the platform has seen no major incidents and that it cannot establish a link between case handling and distress. The problems were identified by a nine-month Radio-Canada investigation that used ministry data, a recording of a government meeting and union surveys.

What happened

No source tells the story step by step yet.

What was done

No source states an action or fix.

Risks

Sorted by rule from the case's fields; not yet read from the sources.

Controls

Not yet read for controls. Controls that mitigate the primary risk:

Harness

Tool allow-list · Fail-closed defaults · Stop control

Application

Human approval for high-impact actions · Change review and separation of duties · Least-privilege access for the agent · Production kept apart from test · Activity logs · Adversarial testing before deployment

Infrastructure / target

Backups and recovery

Evidence

No source states: a step-by-step account, when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what set it off, what was done.

Show the full account: 3 items from the primary sources

What happened, in order

  1. Between February and September 2025 Phone lines were overwhelmed as errors accumulated.
  2. Between February and September 2025 Nearly 150,000 calls were rejected and 94,000 were abandoned during the eight-month window.

Not dated in the sources:

  • The ministry contracted a private external firm to handle phones, which the union says risks errors and information leaks.
Show every field, with its source and grade

The AI system

What it was for
simplify and humanize services
C one secondary source states it

What happened

Earliest source we hold
2026-03-26
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
What went wrong
operational mistake
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Impact

Severity
moderate
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Why this severity
tier: data and services of others touched, with a bounded scope stated as the eight-month window from February to September 2025
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Notes on gaps

The 2024 INRS warning is not treated as a failed control. No remediations are reported; the ministry's statements deny major incidents. Currency values are in CAD as stated and are not converted.

LR-2026-0474 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON