AI Risk Wire

Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0419

341 malicious ClawHub skills found stealing data from OpenClaw users

Preliminary Why: 1 report: The Hacker News · subject to change · 1 independent report

Status: action reported, no fix

Severity moderate
Reported 2 Feb 2026

No source states: loss or records, developer and model, agent tool, could do, deployer, industry.

Severity moderate: data of others is touched (crypto assets, API keys, wallet keys, SSH credentials, browser passwords) with a bounded scope stated as 341 malicious skills across multiple campaigns.

ClawHub is a marketplace for third-party skills that extend OpenClaw, a self-hosted AI assistant, and OpenClaw users install them. A security audit by Koi Security of 2,857 skills found 341 malicious skills across multiple campaigns. Of these, 335 used fake prerequisites to install the Atomic Stealer macOS malware, and others hid reverse shell backdoors or exfiltrated bot credentials. A report from OpenSourceMalware flagged the same campaign. The marketplace is open by default and lets anyone upload skills, and OpenClaw's creator has since added a reporting feature that hides skills after more than three unique reports.

What happened

1 · What it was doingOpenClaw users installed third-party skills from the ClawHub marketplace, an extension to the OpenClaw AI assistant.
2 · What went wrongA security audit found 341 malicious skills among 2,857 skills on ClawHub, across multiple campaigns.
3 · How it was caughtKoi Security's analysis found the malicious skills and the fake prerequisites used to install the Atomic Stealer macOS malware.

What was done

OpenClaw's creator rolled out a reporting feature that lets signed-in users flag skills.

Risks

Supply-chain compromise
Primary
24 incidents
Rising: 4 vs 0.2 a week

Read from the sources; not yet reviewed by a person.

Controls

Application

Did not exist Vetting of plug-ins, skills and dependencies

Control failure chain

L1 · Model Not stated in sourcesProvider not named
L2 · Harness Not stated in sourcesHarness not named
L3 · Application Did not existDeployer not named
L4 · Infrastructure / target Not stated in sourcesOrganisation hit

L1 · ModelProvider not namedModel provider

No source mentions a control at this layer.

Model version not linked to a model card.

L2 · HarnessHarness not namedAgent framework vendor

No source mentions a control at this layer.

Other controls for this risk at this layer, not mentioned in the sources: Sandboxed code execution.

L3 · ApplicationDeployer not namedDeployer

Did not existVetting of plug-ins, skills and dependencies“The only restriction at this stage is that a publisher must have a GitHub account that's at least one week old.”The Hacker News

Other controls for this risk at this layer, not mentioned in the sources: Signed and verified components, AI bill of materials, Vulnerability scanning of AI components, Model provenance checks, Least-privilege access for the agent.

L4 · Infrastructure / targetOrganisation hit

No source mentions a control at this layer.

Other controls for this risk at this layer, not mentioned in the sources: Secrets scanning.

EffectiveNot effectiveNot effective (bypassed)Did not existNot stated in sourcesNot yet checkedAttacker's ownOrder: model · harness · application · target

Controls for this risk: result in this incident

ControlPart of the systemResult
Sandboxed code executionL2 HarnessNot stated in sources
Vetting of plug-ins, skills and dependenciesL3 ApplicationDid not exist
Least-privilege access for the agentL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Signed and verified componentsL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
AI bill of materialsL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Vulnerability scanning of AI componentsL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Model provenance checksL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Secrets scanningL4 Infrastructure / targetNot stated in sources

Similar incidents

All cases of this kind ›

Evidence

No source states: what it reached or did, when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what set it off.

Show the full account: 3 items from the primary sources

What happened, in order

Not dated in the sources:

  • OpenSourceMalware published a report flagging the same ClawHavoc campaign, coinciding with the Koi findings.
  • OpenClaw's creator later rolled out a user reporting feature for flagging skills.
  • Palo Alto Networks had earlier warned that OpenClaw carries a lethal trifecta of risks for AI agents.
Show every field, with its source and grade

What happened

Earliest source we hold
2026-02-02
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who caught it
an outside party
C one secondary source states it
Who caused it
an outside attacker
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
security breach
C one secondary source states it
primary risk
RK06
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
secondary risks
RK04, RK03
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
control chain
layer: L3; party: deployer; control id: G3; outcome: missing; quote: The only restriction at this stage is that a publisher must have a GitHub account that's at least one week old.; source index: 0
C one secondary source states it

Impact

Severity
moderate
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Why this severity
data of others is touched (crypto assets, API keys, wallet keys, SSH credentials, browser passwords) with a bounded scope stated as 341 malicious skills across multiple campaigns.
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

LR-2026-0419 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON