AI Risk Wire

Cases › leaked private data › LR-2026-0367

Eindhoven officials expose resident data on public AI websites

Preliminary Why: Publisher not yet named · subject to change

Developing: a major or severe case captured in the last 72 hours. Later changes are logged on the corrections page.

Status: no action reported

Severity major
Reported 19 Dec 2025
Developer and model OpenAI · ChatGPT
Industry public administration

No source states: loss or records, agent tool, could do, deployer.

Severity major: Unbounded scope stated: the full scope of the breach is unknown and the municipality cannot notify all individuals whose information may have been exposed

Staff at the municipality of Eindhoven uploaded personal data of residents and employees, including sensitive files from care and support departments, to public AI websites including ChatGPT. The city ran a 30-day sample from 23 September to 23 October 2025 and found several types of personal data, including Jeugdwet documents, internal reports and CVs. Because uploaded data is stored only 30 days, the full extent cannot be determined and not every affected individual can be notified. The breach was reported to the Dutch Data Protection Authority on 23 October 2025. Afterwards the municipality blocked staff access to public AI websites, restricted employees to an internal AI tool in a secure environment, asked OpenAI to delete uploaded files, and intensified monitoring of external data traffic. The city also hired Hooghiemstra and Partners to investigate the breach.

What happened

1 · What it was doingMunicipal staff uploaded personal data of residents and employees to public AI websites, including ChatGPT.
2 · What went wrongSensitive files from care and support departments were included in the uploads.
3 · What it reached or didThe breach primarily affects vulnerable residents, according to the city.
4 · How it was caughtThe city ran a 30-day sample that found several types of personal data in the uploads.

What was done

No source states an action or fix.

Risks

Read from the sources; not yet reviewed by a person.

Controls

Not yet read for controls. Controls that mitigate the primary risk:

Harness

Network egress control

Application

Sensitive-data checks on outbound data · Output filtering and redaction · Human approval for high-impact actions · Data minimisation · Least-privilege access for the agent · Activity logs

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Evidence

No source states: when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what set it off, what was done.

Show every field, with its source and grade

The AI system

Model
ChatGPT
C one secondary source states it
Developer
OpenAI
C one secondary source states it

What happened

Earliest source we hold
2025-12-19
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who was responsible
the organisation using it
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
leaked private data
C one secondary source states it
primary risk
RK04
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
secondary risks
RK15
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Impact

Severity
major
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Kind of harm
privacy
C one secondary source states it
Why this severity
Unbounded scope stated: the full scope of the breach is unknown and the municipality cannot notify all individuals whose information may have been exposed
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Context

Industry
public administration
C one secondary source states it
Country
Netherlands
C one secondary source states it

Notes on gaps

The article date 2025-12-19 is not used as a disclosure date because the source does not state when the city first made the breach public.

LR-2026-0367 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON