AI Risk Wire

Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0344

Researchers hack Copilot AI agent, exposing fraud risks

Preliminary Why: 1 report: SecurityBrief Australia · subject to change · 1 independent report

Status: no action reported

Severity minor
Reported 12 Dec 2025
Agent tool Microsoft Copilot Studio
Industry travel

No source states: loss or records, developer and model, could do, deployer.

Tenable researchers built a demonstration travel agent in Microsoft Copilot Studio to handle customer travel reservations, able to create and modify bookings without human intervention. The agent was loaded with demonstration customer records, including names, contact details and credit card information, and was configured to verify identity before sharing data or changing bookings. Researchers then used a prompt injection technique to hijack its workflow. They booked a free holiday and extracted payment card data, and changed a trip price to zero, which the researchers said granted services without authorisation. The agent's broad edit permissions covered the financial fields in booking records. Tenable disclosed the research, which was reported on 2025-12-12, and recommended limiting agent write rights and monitoring agent behaviour.

What happened

1 · What it was doingA demonstration travel agent built in Copilot Studio handled customer reservations and could create or modify bookings without human intervention.
2 · What went wrongResearchers used a prompt injection technique to hijack the agent's workflow.
3 · What it reached or didThe hijacked agent booked a free holiday and disclosed payment card data.

What was done

No source states an action or fix.

Risks

Read from the sources; not yet reviewed by a person.

Controls

Not yet read for controls. Controls that mitigate the primary risk:

Harness

Outside content treated as data, not instructions · Prompt-injection detection · Confirmation after untrusted input · Validation of tool inputs and outputs · Tool allow-list

Application

Human approval for high-impact actions · Least-privilege access for the agent · Segmentation of agent components · Alerts on unusual tool use

Evidence

No source states: how it was caught, when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what was done.

Show the full account: 7 items from the primary sources

What happened, in order

Not dated in the sources:

  • Researchers built a demonstration AI travel agent within Copilot Studio.
  • Researchers loaded the system with demonstration customer records.
  • Tenable then attempted to subvert the agent using a prompt injection technique.
  • The researchers hijacked the agent's workflow.
  • The researchers instructed the agent to change the trip price to zero.
  • The agent carried out the price change.
  • Tenable disclosed the research.
Show every field, with its source and grade

The AI system

Software around the model
Microsoft Copilot Studio
C one secondary source states it
How much it acted alone
it acted alone, unwatched
C one secondary source states it
What it was for
routine customer service
C one secondary source states it

What happened

Earliest source we hold
2025-12-12
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
What set it off
hidden instructions in its input
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
security breach
C one secondary source states it
AI agent
an AI agent acted
C one secondary source states it
What it did
prompt injection hijacked the agent's workflow
C one secondary source states it
primary risk
RK01
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
secondary risks
RK02, RK04
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Impact

Severity
minor
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Kind of harm
privacy, money
C one secondary source states it
Who was affected
demonstration customer records
C one secondary source states it
Kinds of data exposed
names, contact details, credit card information
C one secondary source states it

Context

Industry
travel
C one secondary source states it

Notes on gaps

No count of affected parties or records, and no monetary loss, is stated. The identity-check bypass is reported but no matching control id was assigned. Remediation items are recommendations, not changes made by a party, so kind is advice.

LR-2026-0344 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON