Cases › operational mistake › LR-2026-0298
Ava AI agent misclassified emergency caller as nonemergency during 2024 rollout
Preliminary Why: Publisher not yet named · subject to change
Severity minor: The misclassified call was quickly transferred to a human dispatcher, contained to one call with no third party harmed.
Earliest source we hold 2026-10-31 · Captured by AI Risk Wire 2026-10-31 20:30 UTC
Ava, an AI agent made by Seattle startup Aurelian, answers nonemergency calls for Snohomish County 911 and other agencies.
Risks this incident falls under
| Risk | Role | NIST AI 600-1 | Incidents | Last 6 quarters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agent takes destructive or unapproved actions | Primary | Human-AI Configuration | 18 |
Sorted by rule from the case's fields; not yet read from the sources.
Control failure chain
L1 · ModelAurelianModel provider
Sources not yet read for controls.
Model version not linked to a model card.
L2 · HarnessAvaAgent framework vendor
Sources not yet read for controls.
Other controls for this risk at this layer, not yet read for: Tool allow-list, Fail-closed defaults, Stop control.
L3 · ApplicationDeployer not namedDeployer
Sources not yet read for controls.
Other controls for this risk at this layer, not yet read for: Human approval for high-impact actions, Change review and separation of duties, Least-privilege access for the agent, Production kept apart from test, Activity logs, Adversarial testing before deployment.
L4 · Infrastructure / targetOrganisation hit
Sources not yet read for controls.
Other controls for this risk at this layer, not yet read for: Backups and recovery.
HeldFailedGot aroundMissingNot mentionedNot read yetAttacker's ownOrder: model · harness · application · target
The same controls in other incidents of this risk
| Control | Layer | Here | Held elsewhere | Did not hold elsewhere |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tool allow-list | L2 Harness | Not read yet | none | none |
| Stop control | L2 Harness | Not read yet | none | none |
| Fail-closed defaults | L2 Harness | Not read yet | none | none |
| Least-privilege access for the agent | L3 Application | Not read yet | none | none |
| Production kept apart from test | L3 Application | Not read yet | none | 1 |
| Human approval for high-impact actions | L3 Application | Not read yet | none | 3 |
| Change review and separation of duties | L3 Application | Not read yet | none | none |
| Activity logs | L3 Application | Not read yet | none | none |
| Adversarial testing before deployment | L3 Application | Not read yet | none | none |
| Backups and recovery | L4 Infrastructure / target | Not read yet | none | none |
Remediation
Fix reported
“Updates to Ava since then factor in situations like this.”
No later incident for Aurelian under this risk on record.
Risk grouping: Not yet classified
No source we hold states: who caused it, intended or not, before or after release, the ai's part.
The story
No source states: how it was caught, when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what set it off.
Show every field, with its source and grade
The AI system
What happened
Impact
Context
LR-2026-0298 · version 2 · published 2026-10-31 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · changes to this case · JSON