Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0288
Fake Polymarket platforms use LLM chat agents with provider-switching to defraud victims
Preliminary Why: 1 report: Cyber Security News · subject to change · 1 independent report
Developing: a major or severe case captured in the last 72 hours. Later changes are logged on the corrections page.
Severity major: Many victims across multiple fake platforms lost cryptocurrency, with self-reported deposits of about $10.97 million, though the figures are unverified.
Earliest source we hold 2026-10-30 · Captured by AI Risk Wire 2026-10-31 02:29 UTC
Three Russian-speaking fraud teams (AtlasCore, PolyFucked, Magnetic Team) sell ready-made fake Polymarket-style prediction market sites to affiliates.
Risks this incident falls under
| Risk | Role | NIST AI 600-1 | Incidents | Last 6 quarters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI used to run a cyber attack | Primary | Information Security | 33 | |
| AI system attacked or breached | Also | Information Security | 1 |
Sorted by rule from the case's fields; not yet read from the sources.
Control failure chain
L1 · ModelProvider not namedModel provider
Sources not yet read for controls.
Model version not linked to a model card.
9 more for this risk at this layer
L2 · HarnessHarness not namedAgent framework vendor
Sources not yet read for controls.
L3 · ApplicationDeployer not namedDeployer
Sources not yet read for controls.
L4 · Infrastructure / targetOrganisation hitOrganisation hit
Sources not yet read for controls.
6 more for this risk at this layer
HeldFailedGot aroundMissingNot mentionedNot read yetAttacker's ownOrder: model · harness · application · target
The same controls in other incidents of this risk
| Control | Layer | Here | Held elsewhere | Did not hold elsewhere |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Content safety classifiers | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | – |
| Safety training and refusal | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | 1 |
| Cyber and weapons safeguards | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | – |
| Dangerous-capability testing before release | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | – |
| Outside red-teaming | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | – |
| Staged or restricted release | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | – |
| Abuse monitoring and account enforcement | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | – |
| Reasoning monitoring | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | 1 |
| Safeguards kept on in testing | L1 Model | Not read yet | – | – |
| Known flaws patched | L4 Infrastructure / target | Not read yet | – | – |
| Multi-factor sign-in and password policy | L4 Infrastructure / target | Not read yet | – | – |
| Network segmentation | L4 Infrastructure / target | Not read yet | – | – |
| Intrusion and endpoint detection | L4 Infrastructure / target | Not read yet | – | – |
| Backups and recovery | L4 Infrastructure / target | Not read yet | – | – |
| Phishing and fraud filters | L4 Infrastructure / target | Not read yet | – | – |
Risk grouping: Not yet classified
No source we hold states: who caused it, intended or not, before or after release, the ai's part.
The story
No source states: when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, the cause, what set it off.
Show every field, with its source and grade
The AI system
What happened
Impact
Context
LR-2026-0288 · version 2 · published 2026-10-31 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · changes to this case · JSON