AI Risk Wire

AI Risk Monitor

Which safety controls failed, were bypassed or worked · Last 6 months

How we count

Every control named in the real-world incidents made public in May 2026 – Oct 2026, from the published control readings, each incident counted once per control and outcome. Controls with the most incidents where they failed, were bypassed or were not in place come first. Control readings of incidents not yet published are not used.

FailedBypassedNot in placeWorked
Human approval for high-impact actions 33 6Outside content treated as data, not instructions 21 3Least-privilege access for the agent 11 2Age assurance 2Confirmation after untrusted input 2Prompt-injection detection 2Safety training and refusal 11 2Network egress control 2People told they are dealing with AI 1Output filtering and redaction 1Reasoning monitoring 1Sandboxed code execution 1Fail-closed defaults 111 1Activity logs 1Vetting of plug-ins, skills and dependencies 1Risk assessment per deployment 1Known flaws patched 1Network segmentation 1Stop control 2Independent check of task results 1

20 of 410 incidents read for controls.

Controls in incidents read so far

sample: 42 of 778 incidents · not a trend

ControlWorkedFailedBypassedAbsent
Human approval for high-impact actions3277
Network egress control1135
Live behaviour monitoring115
Least-privilege access for the agent32
Stop control5
Sandboxed code execution23
Cyber and weapons safeguards4
Reasoning monitoring4
Outside content treated as data, not instructions21

How controls were got around

19 cases, latest 6, in the source’s words

First reportedControlHow
2026-10-26Human approval for high-impact actions, Sandboxed code execution“It also makes it install a malicious npm package, adds a flag to bypass confirmation and the sandbox (a mechanism that limits the agent's scope of action), and makes it run Codex again.” note(ノート) · LR-2026-0259
2026-10-08Fail-closed defaults“The platform’s design choice effectively bypasses the security controls that developers and IT decision-makers assume are in place.” Forkast · LR-2026-0138
2026-09-24Output filtering and redaction“We were eventually able to fully bypass all these mechanisms and exfiltrate data.” Zenity Labs · LR-2026-0054
2026-09-24Network egress control“And so, this method can survive HTTP egress controls.” Zenity Labs · LR-2026-0054
2026-09-16Network egress control“collaborating agents uploaded a workbook to public hosting services so other agents could retrieve it, despite instructions to use only local files.” Axios · LR-2026-0016
2026-09-04Network egress control“The environment allowed traffic to reach Azure storage hostnames ending in .blob.core.windows.net without passing through its security proxy, but it did not verify that such a hostname was valid.” The Hacker News · LR-2026-0005

Safeguards AI companies claim, against incidents where they broke · Last 6 months

How we count

For each of the 14 controls read from model cards: model versions released in May 2026 – Oct 2026 whose provider, or an outside tester, states it has the control (a checked quote about that version), and real-world incidents made public in that period where it failed, was bypassed or was not in place. The reading of card statements into controls awaits sign-off. Each column has its own scale.

Model versions stating itIncidents where it broke Content safety classifiers 25Safety training and refusal 172Cyber and weapons safeguards 16Abuse monitoring and account enforcement 13Staged or restricted release 8Protection of model weights 7Sandboxed code execution 51Flaw reporting and bug bounty 5Prompt-injection detection 42Reasoning monitoring 31Human approval for high-impact actions 26Marking machine-made output 2Activity logs 1

Model cards are not read for the other 79 controls; their breaks are in the controls chart.

Fixes made or suggested after incidents · Last 6 months

How we count

Controls named in fixes made, or changes suggested by the source, after the real-world incidents made public in May 2026 – Oct 2026, once per incident.

Put in placeSuggested
Vulnerability scanning of AI components 182 20Short-lived, scoped credentials 52 7Live behaviour monitoring 42 6Sandboxed code execution 24 6Least-privilege access for the agent 12 3Output filtering and redaction 11 2Network egress control 11 2Tool allow-list 1Change review and separation of duties 1People told they are dealing with AI 1Content safety classifiers 1Vetting of plug-ins, skills and dependencies 1Human approval for high-impact actions 3Secrets kept out of the model's context 1Prompt-injection detection 1Validation of tool inputs and outputs 1Segmentation of agent components 1Activity logs 1Signed and verified components 1Grounding and fact checks 1

43 of 410 incidents name a control put in place or suggested.

Built 16 Nov 2026. Periods end with the last full week or month; the week or month in progress is not counted. Bold: the five largest rows in each chart, ties included; controls by incidents where the control broke. Linked numbers open the incidents or model versions they count.

Reported incidents, not rates · 75 sources polled hourly since Sep 2026; earlier incidents come from a one-off backfill · English only · stories told twice are not yet merged · our own severity grades are not counted · built 2026-11-16T15:22:29Z

Linked numbers open the incidents they count. Updated 2026-11-16T15:22:29Z